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Abstract 
We present a structural model to investigate the effects of horizontal cooperation on investment in 
the context of telecommunication networks. More specifically, we estimate the effect of network 
sharing in the mobile telecommunications industry on prices, network quality and consumer welfare. 
The presented framework allows estimating the effects of different types of sharing agreements 
including common ownership of shared assets in a joint venture company or collaboration via 
geographical separation (geo-split principle). The proposed identification strategy relies on differences 
in the costs of network deployment of shared versus non-shared network infrastructure, with 
different costs affecting operators’ optimal choice of price and network quality. We apply the 
structural model to estimate the effects of a network sharing agreement in the Czech Republic, using 
a combination of unique datasets on prices, network quality measured as average download speed 
and operator’s costs of network deployment. The results of our model indicate that horizontal 
cooperation on investments may be beneficial for consumers. Specifically, the network sharing 
agreement under study generated cost savings for the sharing parties, which were passed-on to 
consumers in the form of lower prices and higher average download speed. Our findings are of 
relevance to the assessment of network sharing agreements, which, considering the substantial 
investment cost associated with the 5G technology, are likely to play an even greater role in the 
telecommunications industry in the future. The findings are also of relevance to the general literature 
on horizontal cooperation on investments.  
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1. Introduction 
Over the last decade, consolidation in the telecommunication markets across Europe has been closely 
scrutinized by competition authorities and regulators. Faced with increasing demands for data and 
decreasing revenues per user both triggered by the raise of OTT services (like messaging, video and 
streaming apps), mobile network operators (MNOs) continue to look for ways to reduce investment 
costs while accelerating the deployment of their networks. In particular, MNOs have been relying on 
mergers, joint ventures and network sharing agreements (NSAs) as a way of reducing the costs of 
investment. Over the last decade there has been a substantial number of mergers in the mobile 
telecommunications sector in Europe alone. A great proportion of such mergers have been approved 
only once operators offered remedies addressing the anti-competitive effects identified by the 
competition authorities. 
In light of this, NSAs have become attractive for operators in their efforts to save costs and achieve 
wider, faster and less costly network deployment. The extent of sharing, and thus the extent of cost 
savings, ranges from passive sharing (i.e., sharing of physical infrastructure, such as sites and masts) 
to active sharing (i.e., passive sharing with additional sharing of the radio access network (RAN)) to 
core network sharing (i.e., passive and active sharing with additional sharing of the core network). In 
the European Union, passive NSAs are present in all countries and active sharing is becoming more 
frequent as well. With the need to improve mobile networks, the new 5G technology, which involves 
increased deployment costs as it requires a higher densification of the network, is very likely to further 
reinforce this trend. Thus, a clearer understanding of the effects of this specific type of horizontal 
cooperation is needed.  
Mergers are generally assessed by weighing potential anticompetitive effects from the reduction in 
competition with the pro-competitive efficiencies generated by the transaction. With regard to 
potential anticompetitive effects, merger review often focuses on the pricing implications as increased 
concentration in the market following the merger might result in higher prices for consumers. In 
contrast to mergers, NSAs are about horizontal cooperation on network investments and mainly serve 
the purpose of eliminating the unnecessary duplication of certain parts of the mobile networks and 
the associated investment costs, while pricing and other commercial decisions continue to be made 
independently. The competitive effects of NSAs depend on the specificities of the agreement and the 
wider market in which the agreement takes place. NSAs have been widely acknowledged by the 
European Commission (EC) and national competition authorities (NCAs) as viable alternatives to 
mergers and joint ventures that bring benefits to consumers. 5 Recently, in the merger between INWIT 
and Telecom Italia and Vodafone in Italy, the EC welcomed the parties NSAs and acknowledged that 
the NSAs will not only lead to a faster roll out of 5G but they will also increase the areas over which 
Telecom Italia and Vodafone will continue to compete on network quality.6  At the same time, the EC 
                                                          
5 See for instance EC Case COMP/M. 7758 Hutchison 3G Italy / Wind / JV, p. 287-302 or EC Case COMP/M. 7612 
H3g/O2. The Danish competition authority also approved an NSA including RAN sharing between Telia/Telenor 
in 2012 (see https://www.en.kfst.dk/nyheder/kfst/english/decisions/20120229-radio-access-network-sharing-
agreement-between-telia-denmark-and-telenor/, accessed 15. April 2020). 
6 See EC’s press release on INWIT/Telecom Italia, Vodafone merger, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_414 
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also harbors concerns as to possible anti-competitive effects of NSAs arising from cooperation in 
network deployment or operation.7 
In this paper we set up a model aimed at capturing the interplay between the positive effects of a 
mobile NSA - efficiencies brought by cost reductions in deploying and operating the shared mobile 
network – and the potential anti-competitive effects – the potential risk of a softening of competition 
due to the cooperation of operators on part of the mobile network. Our structural model disentangles 
the demand and supply effects of the NSA and quantifies these opposing elements and their net effect 
on consumer welfare. Supply effects are measured as estimated cost savings resulting from the NSA. 
Demand effects are measured based on the effect of the NSA on prices and the quality of the mobile 
network. In terms of quality, the NSA allows the operators to implement a new technology (e.g., 3G, 
4G or 5G) that provides a better quality, i.e., higher download speeds and a better coverage. The 
model also allows us to test the hypothesis that the cooperation among operators resulting from the 
NSA might have a negative effect on network quality compared to network quality that would be 
observed in a counterfactual without NSA. 
Using data on the mobile telecommunications market in the Czech Republic, we find that two NSAs 
between two of the main MNOs – O2 and T-Mobile Czech Republic (TMCZ) – that are organized as a 
geo-split agreement and covering the 2G, 3G and the 4G technologies, have a positive effect on both, 
operators and consumers. In particular, our model finds that costs of the operators are roughly 40% 
lower when the NSAs are in place compared to costs incurred if operators had to deploy the network 
independently. These costs savings are passed on to consumers via lower prices, with prices on 
average being 14% lower with the NSAs compared to the counterfactual of independent network 
deployment. Consumers also benefit from the NSAs by enjoying greater network quality. Compared 
to independent deployment, network quality measured in terms of download speed is on average 
24% higher under the NSAs. Lower prices and improved quality translate into higher consumer 
welfare. Four years after the implementation of the NSAs, total consumer surplus over this period is 
€1.8 billion larger than consumer surplus under independent network deployment. 
NSAs among MNOs already play an important role as a way for MNOs to reduce network deployment 
and operation costs. This role is likely to increase in importance with the advent of 5G, which will 
require much denser networks than older technologies. Our findings are thus not only of relevance 
for the assessment of existing NSAs but also offer important implications for the deployment of 5G. In 
addition, we believe that our findings are also of relevance to the general literature on horizontal 
cooperation among competitors. 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a discussion of related 
literature, while Section 3 provides relevant background information on the mobile 
telecommunications industry and the different types of network sharing. Section 4 describes the 
framework of our structural model and the mechanism to identify the effects of network sharing on 
MNO’s costs. In Section 5, we estimate our structural model on the mobile telecommunications 
industry in the Czech Republic. Complementing these findings, we present reduced-form evidence on 
                                                          
7 This led to the opening of case AT 40305 in 2015, where the EC voiced concerns regarding possible anti-
competitive effects arising from the NSA between TMCZ and O2 in the Czech mobile telecommunications 
industry. Similarly, the Hungarian competition authority is also investigating an NSA between Magyar Telekom 
and Telenor. See BEREC (2018) , p. 14-15. 
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the effects of network sharing in the Czech Republic on network quality in Section 6. Section 7 
discusses further robustness checks of the structural model and Section 8 concludes. 
2. Literature review 
We study the effects of network sharing by using a structural model of competition among network 
operators focusing on the strategic choice of network quality. To demonstrate how this approach 
applies in practice, it is estimated on the Czech mobile telecommunications market that saw network 
sharing agreements between two large mobile network operators in 2013/2014. Maier-Rigaud, Ivaldi 
& Heller (2020) also provide an evaluation of the Czech NSA focusing on its price effects. They estimate 
both a difference-in-differences model and a structural model of price competition among network 
operators. In line with the results of this paper, they find that the Czech NSA resulted in lower prices 
and higher consumer surplus. Their paper, however, does not directly estimate the effects of the NSA 
on network quality. 
Our paper contributes to a recent stream of research that theoretically derives the welfare effects of 
competition among network operators. Bourreau et al. (2018) study the effects of network sharing via 
co-investment agreements. Co-investment in their setup means that an entrant can ask an incumbent 
to share its infrastructure, by taking on half the of infrastructure investment costs after the investment 
plan has been announced.8 It is thus akin to a geo-split agreement in the sense that the optimal level 
of network quality is decided independently but the deployed network and the costs of deployment 
are shared with the financing partners. In line with our empirical results, they predict that co-
investment agreements stimulate infrastructure investments and enhance social welfare.  
In a similar vein, Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011) compare the effects of different regulatory regimes of 
per-unit access pricing versus risk-sharing. Risk-sharing among network operators in their setup 
implies that firms jointly decide on the investment level to maximize their profits, which is comparable 
to the concept of a joint venture agreement in our structural model. While our empirical application 
finds beneficial effects of network sharing under a geo-split agreement, Nitsche and Wiethaus’ (2011) 
theoretical model suggests that risk-sharing regimes also generate higher consumer surplus, 
compared to per-unit access pricing. In contrast, Krämer and Vogelsang (2016) offer an experimental 
study that estimates the effects of co-investment agreements in network infrastructure.9 Based on a 
simple network competition game between duopolistic firms, they report that co-investment may 
facilitate tacit collusion, resulting in higher prices and lower consumers surplus. Our empirical results, 
based on the effects of a real network sharing agreement, do not confirm the laboratory results of 
Krämer and Vogelsang (2017) but instead show that network sharing results in lower prices and higher 
consumer surplus. 
                                                          
8 In reality, co-investment agreements can be undertaken by well-established operators and can also be signed 
ab initio, that is before any investment plan is announced. 
9 Co-investment in Krämer and Vogelsang (2016) is defined as co-investing in a single shared network 
infrastructure and subsequent competition at the retail level. As in Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011), this setup is 
comparable to the joint venture agreement in our structural model, described in Section 4.2. 
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Our paper also contributes to the theoretical literature that studies the relationship between 
competition and investments.10 In a recent contribution, Federico et al (2017) develop a stylized model 
to explain the effects of a merger on the merging parties’ incentives to invest in innovation. They argue 
that the effect depends on the interplay of an “innovation externality”, that is the internalization of a 
reduction in expected profits that an innovation by one party causes on the other party, and “price 
coordination”, that is the elimination of price competition between the merging firms. They argue that 
absent efficiencies or spillover effects a merger reduces the incentives to innovate with the main 
driver being the innovation externality that reduces appropriability. 
Motta and Tarantino (2017) also study the effects of a merger on the incentives to invest in cost-
reducing innovations but allow for the possibility of a partial merger that involves cooperation on the 
investment decision without cooperation on prices decision. They find that partial mergers in general 
tend to be better for consumers than full mergers.11 While our paper does not explicitly model the 
investment decisions of network operators, it provides empirical support that network sharing 
agreements, which can under some circumstances be thought of as partial mergers, are beneficial for 
consumers.12 
3. Mobile telecommunication infrastructure and network sharing 
agreements (Difference between geo-split and JV) 
A mobile network is usually divided into two parts: the local radio access network (RAN) and the core 
network (CN). The CN provides the functionality of services and connects to internet and telephony 
networks, while the RAN connects end user’s mobile devices to the core network. The last 
interconnecting link between the RAN and the end user is wireless. Establishing such a wireless 
connection requires building an infrastructure of fixed-location transceivers, also called base stations 
                                                          
10 This theoretical literature can be traced back to the seminal works by Schumpeter and Arrow who defined 
two opposing views. According to Schumpeter (1942), innovation leads to higher margins and thus a monopolist 
has more incentive to invest than a firm in a competitive market because the monopolist seeks to maintain its 
leading position in the market. Arrow (1962) in contrast showed that incentives to innovate can be stronger in 
competitive markets as firms facing competition will seek to innovation to outperform competition. A 
monopolist instead has lower incentives to innovate because doing so could cannibalize its own sales. See also 
d’Aspremont & Jacquemin (1988) for an early contribution showing that cooperation between competitors on 
investments (in R&D) can be socially beneficial. 
11 While both Federico et al (2017) and Motta and Tarantino (2017) have quite strong implications for the 
analysis of the effects of horizontal mergers on incentives to innovate, their modelling approaches have been 
criticized by others. Denicolo and Polo (2018), Bourreau and Jullien (2018) as well as Jullien and Lefouili (2018) 
argue that these economic analyses rely on restrictive assumptions and thus do not support the view that 
horizontal mergers always reduce incentives to invest and innovate. These authors conclude that given the 
uncertainty of the direction of the effect, merger control should bear in mind that depending on the facts the 
case the effect of the merger can go either way. This also suggests that NSAs, which lead to coordination of 
investment, but not pricing decisions, should be seen more positively than mergers, since there is no harmful 
price coordination. 
12 Our application to the network sharing agreement in the Czech Republic, however, should not be thought of 
as equivalent to a partial merger as described by Motto and Tarantino (2017) because, as we argue, network 
sharing agreements organized on a geo-split principle do not involve the coordination on network quality. 
Furthermore, investments under NSAs should in general not be thought of as cost-reducing innovations but cost 
reductions due to the avoidance of unnecessary network duplication.  
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or cells, and associated antennas. The base stations itself require physical locations, such as sites, mast 
or building rooftops, on which they can be built. Building and operating a mobile telecommunication 
network thus requires large infrastructure investments. 
With increased demand for data-intensive services the deployed capacity of the network could come 
to its limits and, once all spectrum has been deployed and other capacity-enhancing technologies have 
been deployed, the operators may have to increase the number of base stations, which is costly. In 
addition, the rollout of newer technology standards, especially 5G, further increases the need to build 
more base stations to ensure high data transfer rates and fast coverage throughout a country.13 
To allow for cost savings in rolling out the necessary infrastructure, mobile network operators can use 
different forms of network sharing. Passive sharing involves the sharing of basic infrastructure, such 
as the space at a rooftop of a building or on a telecommunication tower, the antenna masts, power 
supplies and air conditioning systems. In addition to sharing of passive assets, active sharing usually 
involves the sharing of the RAN equipment, meaning the base stations and antennas.14 Under most 
types of active sharing agreements, mobile network operators share the passive and active equipment 
but continue to provide services using their own dedicated frequency bands (spectrum). Finally, it is 
possible for MNOs to integrate at an even deeper level and share their allocated spectrum in the 
available frequency bands, or even some elements (or all) of their individual CN. 
The different forms of network sharing and the associated cost savings associated with a greater 
degree of sharing are illustrated in Figure 3-1. In general, a greater degree of network sharing can be 
expected to allow greater cost savings, both regarding the cost of building new sites (CAPEX) and in 
maintaining and operating existing sites (OPEX). 
                                                          
13 In addition, with each new technology and each new spectrum being deployed, operators are required to 
meet certain coverage obligations within a specific timeline. Meeting the requirements of the coverage 
obligations thus becomes more costly under newer technology standards, which creates incentives for network 
operators to engage in NSAs in order to save costs. 
14 More specifically, active sharing means that MNOs jointly plan (coordinate) the deployment of the key 
components of the RAN, namely the base stations and antennas that are required to provide the wireless 
connection to the end users. There is, however, some uncertainty around whether antennas are to be 
considered as passive or active assets. 
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Figure 3-1: Types of network sharing 
Source: Authors’ illustration based on Belgian Institute for Postal services and Telecommunications. 
When network operators decide to share parts of the mobile network, there are various ways to 
deploy and operate the network. One common practice is to form a joint venture (JV) company, which 
operates the parts of the shared network and provides the services to the sharing parties. Another 
common practice of collaboration is the geographic separation of the shared mobile network. Under 
this geo-split principle each operator operates the mobile network its respective area, which is its 
master area. In the master area, both the subscribers from the Master operator and from the other 
sharing operators (the Visitor operators) use the Master operator’s mobile network.15 Finally, in a “salt 
and pepper” model, which is very similar to a geo-split ownership, the sharing parties additionally 
operate their own independent sites within the area of the Master operator.16 Under this type of 
agreement, the parties are thus sharing parts of their network but continue to operate and deploy 
independent sites. 
Figure 3-2 depicts the different types of network sharing that vary in the degree of asset ownership of 
the mobile network infrastructure. 
                                                          
15 The Misitor operators, however, keeps controls over its subscribers and services. Sharing via the geo-split 
principle does also not necessarily affect the independence of each party for network planning and deployment. 
Indeed, each operator may still be able to request from the other operator unilateral network deployment in its 
master area. 
16 Independent network deployments differ from unilateral deployments as they are done directly by the Visitor 
operator without involving the Master operator, while unilateral deployments are implemented by the Master 
operator upon request and for the benefit of the Visitor operator. 
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Figure 3-2: Asset ownership options 
 Source: Authors’ illustration based on Andersen (2016). 
Under a JV agreement, strategic decisions relating to investments in infrastructure and the 
deployment of technology are made to maximize the joint profits of all sharing parties. In contrast, 
under a geo-split ownership model each operator is responsible for operating the network in its 
master area, implying that investments into network infrastructure are governed largely 
independently.17 The differences in the profit-maximizing behavior of sharing firms under a JV or a 
geo-split agreement, respectively, are a central component of the structural model presented in 
Section 5 that uses different behavioral assumptions to evaluate the effects of NSAs, depending on 
the underlying ownership structure of the agreement. 
4. Theoretical model 
Network sharing can result in both pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects. The most direct pro-
competitive effect is the reduction in infrastructure expenditures: each sharing party needs to build 
fewer sites to provide coverage to their respective customers, which translates into lower CAPEX. In 
maintaining and operating a site, savings in OPEX can also be realized, for example by sharing the 
rental costs of a site or the costs for energy consumption. Given the overall reduced demand for sites, 
there may be additional indirect effects whereby in congested areas rents may be reduced to allow 
third party MNOs to also roll-out and operate sites more cheaply, which translates into lower CAPEX 
and OPEX for third parties.18 Finally, the reduced cost of building and maintaining network 
infrastructure does not only benefit firms but can be passed on to consumers in the form of lower 
prices or higher quality of service. 
Network sharing also results in quality improvements through greater network coverage or through 
network densification. Regarding the latter point, if two MNOs share their networks, each operator 
will have a higher effective density of consumers by additionally serving consumers from the sharing 
partner. Ceteris paribus, a higher consumer density increases average download speed per consumer 
as consumers could be served by less distant sites. The sharing parties can thus provide higher quality 
at the same cost or provide the same quality at lower cost. 
Network sharing agreements, however, might also be considered to have some anti-competitive 
effects. If both sharing parties, by the necessity to jointly plan their common infrastructure, are aware 
                                                          
17 As explained above, geo-split agreements (and to some extent JV agreements) may have elements of unilateral 
deployment, whereby one operator requests investments from another operator.  
18 Cf. GSMA (2012). 
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of each other’s investment plans, this may increase their ability to predict and respond to the other’s 
competitive behavior, which might facilitate tacit collusion to achieve higher prices.19 In addition, due 
to the joint operation of mobile infrastructure, there may be greater commonality of costs, which 
might further enhance their ability to collude tacitly. 
A structural model can disentangle the different potential effects of the NSAs and measure the net 
effect on consumer welfare. It is possible to investigate different assumptions on the sharing parties 
strategic behavior regarding the choice of network quality. The following sub-sections explain how 
consumer demand for telecommunication services and firm’s strategic behavior could be described in 
a structural modelling framework.  
4.1.  Demand model 
Consumer demand is assumed to be represented by a nested logit model, following Berry (1994).20 
The nested logit model groups consumers’ choices into nests and creates a hierarchical structure 
between alternative options, with choices within nests being closer substitutes than choices across 
different nests.21 In a first step, consumers choose whether to use telecommunication services or not, 
whereby the latter case corresponds to choosing the outside option.22 When choosing to access a 
mobile telecommunications network, a consumer chooses the operator offering the highest relative 
utility compared to other options. The utility realized depends on the network quality as well as on 
the price to use the network. In this setup, the market share of an MNO can be interpreted as a 
measure of the probability that consumers choose to access a particular MNO’s network. Actual 
market shares can be derived based on the total number of active subscribers for an operator. 
The utility consumer j obtains from choosing operator i at time t is described as follows: 
 𝑢௜௝௧ = 𝛽𝑞௜௧ − 𝛼𝑝௜௧ + 𝑥௜௧𝛿 + 𝜉௜௧ + (1 − 𝜎)𝜀௜௝௧ + 𝜁௝௚௧                (1) 
where, 𝛽𝑞௜௧ − 𝛼𝑝௜௧ + 𝑥௜௧𝛿 + 𝜉௜௧ constitutes the mean net valuation for choosing the network of 
operator i at time t that is common to all consumers. It depends on the quality of the network 𝑞௜௧, 
price of using the network 𝑝௜௧, a vector 𝑥௜௧ of observed characteristics and a vector 𝜉௜௧ of unobserved 
characteristics. The term (1 − 𝜎)𝜀௜௝௧ + 𝜁௝௚௧ combines the unobserved random errors and reflects 
individual deviations from the mean valuation. Some deviations are shared within the same nest g 
and are represented by the error 𝜁௝௚௧. Other deviations are specific to consumer j and operator i at 
time t, as represented by 𝜀௜௝௧. Parameter 𝜎 captures the correlation of consumer preferences within 
                                                          
19 Exchange of information could be minimized via “Chinese walls”, separate teams involved in the NSAs’ 
activities, or any retail-specific activities. 
20 For a textbook introduction to the nested logit model, cf. Train (2009). For an application in merger policy, cf. 
Ivaldi and Verboven (2005) or Gollier and Ivaldi (2009). 
21 Alternatively, the nested logit model can be described in terms of correlation structure between the random 
error term representing idiosyncratic preferences of consumers.  
22 Including the “outside option” in measuring the market size allows the model to account for changes in total 
demand when prices change. If the market size excluded the outside option, then the model could only show 
consumer movements from one product to another, but not consumers exiting from the observed market or 
joining the market. The existence of the outside option is also a technical requirement for the nested logit model 
as it allows the identification of the parameters using a simple regression analysis. 
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a nest and lies between zero and one.23 The utility of choosing the outside option is normalized to 
zero. 
From the assumptions on the consumer’s decision-making process, the utility maximizing principle, 
and using the expression for the mean utility in (1) the demand in terms of market shares for each 
operator can be expressed as:24  
 𝑙𝑛 ቀ௦೔೟
௦బ೟
ቁ = 𝜇଴ + 𝛽𝑞௜௧ − 𝛼𝑝௜௧ + 𝜎 𝑙𝑛( 𝑠௜|௚௧) + 𝑥௜௧𝛿 + 𝜉௜௧ (2) 
where, 𝑠௜௧ is the market share of operator i at time t; 𝑠଴௧ is the market share of the outside option at 
time t, 𝑠௜|௚௧  is the market share of operator i within the nest g at time t and 𝜇଴ is a constant. 
To make sure that the demand function is estimated consistently, the endogeneity problem that arises 
from the simultaneous relationship between (unobserved) network quality, prices and market shares 
needs to be accounted for by using instrumental variables.25 
4.2.  Supply model 
On the supply side, each MNO sets the price and the quality of its services for consumers. We consider 
two types of competition between sharing parties. First, MNOs could compete by simultaneously and 
independently setting the level of network quality and price to maximize their own profit. We consider 
that this situation corresponds quite well to a geo-splitting agreement in which each operator 
operates the mobile network in its Master area and the subscribers from both the Master and the 
Visitor operators use the Master operator’s network.26 We label this scenario as “geo-split 
equilibrium”. Second, the sharing parties could compete by simultaneously and independently setting 
prices to maximize their own profits but coordinating on network quality to maximize their joint profit. 
We consider that this situation corresponds quite well to a joint venture agreement with sharing 
parties internalizing the negative impact of increasing network quality on their sharing partners. We 
label this scenario as “JV equilibrium”. 
In reality, MNOs decide on the level of investment in the network (e.g. physical infrastructure or 
available spectrum) and the level of investment has an effect on network quality and the cost of 
                                                          
23 If 𝜎 = 1, there is perfect correlation of preferences for choosing operators within the same nest. In this case, 
in response to a price or quality change consumers never switch to operators outside the nest. As 𝜎 decreases, 
the correlation of preferences for products within the same nest decreases. If 𝜎 = 0, there is no correlation of 
preferences the model reduces to a simple logit model. Consumers are equally likely to switch to operators in a 
different nest as they are to switch in the same group in response to a price or quality change. 
24 To express the demand for each operator in terms of market shares, this derivation assumes that  
(1 − 𝜎)𝜀௜௝௧ + 𝜁௝௚௧  is i.i.d and follows a type I extreme value distribution. 
25 As explained in more detail in the application in Section 5.3.1, different sets of instruments have been 
suggested in the literature to deal with the endogeneity problem, including lags of the endogenous variables 
(Arellano & Bover (1995), Blundell & Bond (1998)), characteristics of products of rival firms a.k.a BLP-type 
instruments (Berry, Levinsohn & Pakes (1995)), and lags of the endogenous variables in comparable markets 
a.k.a Hausman-type instruments (Nevo (2000)). 
26 Additionally, as explained above, depending on the details of the sharing agreement, a Visitor operator may 
also unilaterally request additional sites to be deployed by the Master operator or independently deploy its own 
sites in the area of the Master operator. 
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providing telecommunication services.27 To account for MNO’s strategic behavior with respect to 
network quality and the potential internalization of the negative effects on sharing partners of offering 
higher network quality, we do not explicitly model investments but assume that MNOs can directly 
set the level of network quality, for example the level of download speed available to consumers.28 
The operating profits of an MNO are given by:  
 𝜋௜௧ = (𝑝௜௧ − 𝑐௜௧)𝑠௜௧𝑁௧ − 𝑘௜௧𝑞௜௧ଶ − 𝐾௜௧  (3) 
where: 
 𝑐௜௧ is the marginal cost of operator i at time t of providing access to the network (i.e. 
quantity costs); 
 𝑞௜௧ is the level of network quality of operator i at time t; 
 𝑘௜௧ is the quality cost parameter for operator i at time t; 
 𝑘௜𝑞௜௧ଶ  is the total cost for operator i at time t, of providing quality 𝑞௜௧;29  
 𝑠௜௧ is the market share of operator i at time t; 
 𝑁௧ is the total market size in period t; and  
 𝐾௜௧ is the fixed costs of operator i at time t. 
All firms in the market set prices independently and simultaneously, both under the geo-split and JV 
equilibrium. Equilibrium prices for each MNO are derived from equation (3) by taking the first-order 
condition with respect to prices: 
 (𝑝௜௧ − 𝑐௜௧)
డ௦೔೟
డ௣೔೟
+ 𝑠௜௧ = 0. (4) 
On network quality, as explained above, sharing partners could either set quality simultaneously and 
independently (geo-split equilibrium), or coordinate on the choice of quality (JV equilibrium). All firms 
outside the network sharing agreement are assumed to compete with the sharing parties by 
simultaneously and independently setting quality. 
                                                          
27 As explained in Maier-Rigaud, Heller & Ivaldi (2020), NSA’s primary purpose is the reduction of costs to roll-
out a network. This can both allow MNOs to increase their network quality (by increasing coverage and/or 
capacity) and to lower their prices. 
28 In general, one could also think of a sequential game with MNOs competing by first setting the level of network 
quality and subsequently setting prices. Estimating such a sequential game might be more realistic but would 
computationally be very demanding. Even under a sequential model, however, parameter estimates would still 
be determined by trying to match the same patterns in the data. The simultaneous timing assumption has been 
advocated and implemented by many studies in the academic literature (e.g. Villas-Boas (2007), Fan (2013) or 
Crawford et al. (2018)); hence, one could expect that a simultaneous equilibrium model provides a reasonable 
description of reality with substantial computational benefits. 
29 This implies that marginal costs of operator i at time t of providing network quality is given by 2𝑘௜𝑞௜௧. Total 
quality costs are assumed to be convex to account for the fact that improving network quality becomes 
increasingly costly at higher levels of network quality.  
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In the geo-split equilibrium, network quality for each MNO is derived from equation (3) by taking the 
first-order condition with respect to quality: 
 (𝑝௜௧ − 𝑐௜௧)
డ௦೔೟
డ௤೔೟
𝑁௧ − 2𝑘௜௧𝑞௜௧ = 0.  (5) 
After some algebraic manipulations, the equilibrium level of network quality is given by: 
  𝑞௜௧ீௌ =
ఉ෡
ଶఈෝ௞೔೟
𝑠௜௧𝑁௧.  (6) 
In the JV equilibrium each sharing party maximizes:  
 Max
௤೔,௤ೕ
 (𝑝௜௧ − 𝑐௜௧)𝑠௜௧𝑁௧ − 𝑘௜௧𝑞௜௧ଶ − 𝐾௜௧ + ൫𝑝௝௧ − 𝑐௝௧൯𝑠௝௧𝑁௧ − 𝑘௝௧𝑞௝௧ଶ − 𝐾௝௧ .              (7) 
Equilibrium network quality for is derived by taking the first-order condition with respect to quality:  
 ே೟(ଵିఙෝ)
ఈෝ
൬డ௦೔೟
డ௤೔೟
ଵ
௱೔೟
+ డ௦ೕ೟
డ௤೔೟
ଵ
௱ೕ೟
൰ − 2𝑘௜௧𝑞௜௧ = 0  (8) 
with 𝛥௜௧  and 𝛥௝௧ defined as follows: 
𝛥௜௧ = 1 − 𝜎ො𝑠௜௧/௚ − (1 − 𝜎ො)𝑠௜௧ 
𝛥௝௧ = 1 − 𝜎ො𝑠௝௧/௚ − (1 − 𝜎ො)𝑠௝௧. 
After some algebraic manipulations, the equilibrium level of network quality for the sharing parties is 
given by: 
 𝑞௜௧
௃௏ = ఉ
෡ே೟
ଶఈෝ௞೔೟
𝑠௜௧ ൬1 −
(ఙෝ௦ೕ೟/೒ା(ଵିఙෝ)௦ೕ೟)
(ଵିఙෝ௦ೕ೟/೒ି(ଵିఙෝ)௦ೕ೟)
൰ . (9) 
The equilibrium level of network quality before the start of the NSA as well as for outsiders to the NSA 
is given by the expression in equation (6).  
Given observed equilibrium network quality, the quality cost parameter can be recovered and is given 
by: 
 𝑘௜௧ீௌ =
ఉ෡
ଶఈෝ௤೔೟
𝑠௜௧𝑁௧, (10) 
and 
 𝑘௜௧
௃௏ = ఉ
෡ே೟
ଶఈෝ௤೔೟
𝑠௜௧ ൬1 −
(ఙෝ௦ೕ೟/೒ା(ଵିఙෝ)௦ೕ೟)
(ଵିఙෝ௦ೕ೟/೒ି(ଵିఙෝ)௦ೕ೟)
൰, (11) 
for the geo-split and JV equilibrium, respectively. 
Finally, since the market is assumed to be in equilibrium in each quarter, the prices in the dataset are 
assumed to correspond to a firm’s profit maximizing prices.30 At the profit-maximizing price, prices 
and own-price demand elasticities 𝜂௜௜,௧, are related to marginal costs 𝑐௜௧, via the Lerner index. 
                                                          
30 The market equilibrium occurs when consumers are willing to subscribe to an operator at the stated price, 
and firms are willing to sign up consumers at the stated price. 
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 ௣೔೟ି௖೔೟
௣೔೟
= ฬ ଵ
ఎ೔೔,೟
ฬ. (12) 
The own price elasticity is calculated from the demand estimation and given by 𝜂௜௜,௧ =
− ఈෝ
ଵିఙෝ
𝑝௜௧൫1 − 𝜎ො𝑠௜|௚௧ − (1 − 𝜎ො)𝑠௜௧൯. This implies that marginal costs of providing access to the 
network can be backed out as follows: 
 𝑐௜௧ = 𝑝௜௧ −
ଵିఙෝ
ఈෝ൫ଵିఙෝ௦೔೟|೒ି(ଵିఙෝ)௦೔೟൯
. (13) 
4.3.  Identification 
To evaluate the effects of an NSA, it is necessary to compare the economic environment with the NSA 
in place to the environment that would have resulted had the NSA not been implemented. In our 
model, this is achieved by comparing the costs of network deployment and operation of the sharing 
parties with the costs of outsiders to the sharing agreement. 
As explained in Section 3, depending on the depth of network sharing, greater cost savings can be 
realized compared to the alternative scenario of independent network deployment. While passive 
sharing involves cost savings related to the sharing of site locations and masts, active sharing involves 
additional cost savings related to the sharing of RAN. Under network sharing it is thus expected that 
the cost of deploying and operating a shared network are smaller than the costs of deploying and 
operating a non-shared network. Following this logic, we identify the effects of an NSA by comparing 
the costs of deploying shared sites, which are only observed for the sharing parties to the costs of 
deploying non-shared sites, which are observed for the sharing parties as well as for outsiders to the 
sharing agreement. 
Marginal costs of providing access to the network, 𝑐௜௧, are estimated as follows: 
𝑐௜௧ = 𝑐଴ + 𝜌௦  ௔௥௘ௗ𝑠  𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠௜௧ + 𝜌௡௢௡௦  ௔௥௘ௗ𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑠   𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠௜௧ + 𝜃𝑋௜௧ + 𝜔௜௧,    (14) 
with 𝑠   𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠௜௧ and 𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑠   𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠௜௧ representing the number of shared and non-shared 
sites of operator i at time t and 𝑋௜௧ describing potential additional control variables affecting costs as 
well as firm or time-specific fixed effects. 
Counterfactual costs are computed by assuming that without the NSA, all shared sites would have 
been deployed independently as non-shared sites. This means that the sharing parties would keep 
their total capacity unchanged but would deploy capacity unilaterally at a higher cost.31 
Counterfactual costs for providing access to the network are then derived according to: 
 ?̃?௜௧ = 𝑐௜௧ + (𝜌ො௡௢௡௦  ௔௥௘ௗ − 𝜌ො௦  ௔௥௘ௗ) × 𝑠   𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠௜௧ସீ  (15) 
                                                          
31 Depending on the network sharing agreement, different counterfactual scenarios are conceivable. It is easily 
possible to amend the model to allow for the total number of sites to differ in the counterfactual. Assuming that 
the total number of sites is constant, however, is likely to be a conservative assumption. If the total number of 
sites is higher without the NSAs (only nonshared sites) than the total number of sites with the NSAs (shared and 
nonshared sites), because each MNO has to deploy its own mobile network, it follows that costs per MNO in the 
counterfactual would likely be higher, resulting in higher prices and/or lower quality. 
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where ?̃?௜௧ denotes the costs of providing access to the network in the counterfactual scenario. 
Counterfactual costs of providing network quality can be derived analogously: 
 𝑘෨௜௧் = 𝑘௜௧் + (𝜌ො௡௢௡௦  ௔௥௘ௗ − 𝜌ො௦  ௔௥௘ௗ) × 𝑠   𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠௜௧ସீ (16) 
with 𝑘෨௜௧்  denoting the quality cost parameter in the counterfactual and 𝑇 ∈ {𝐺𝑆, 𝐽𝑉} the geo-split and 
JV equilibrium, respectively. 
After counterfactual costs have been estimated based on the difference in shared and non-shared 
sites, counterfactual market shares, prices and network quality are derived by solving a system of 
simultaneous equations.32 
With demand having a nested logit structure, the system of equations to solve for a given firm i in a 
quarter t, in the counterfactual scenario when the NSA is not active is then given by: 
?̃?௜௧ − 𝑝෤௜௧ + ൬
1 − 𝜎ො
𝛼ො
൰ ቆ
1
1 − 𝜎ො?̃?௜|௚௧ − (1 − 𝜎ො)?̃?௜௧
ቇ = 0 
?̃?௜|௚௧ −
𝑒𝑥𝑝 ቆ𝛿
መ௜௧ + 𝛽መ𝑞෤௜௧  − 𝛼ො𝑝෤௜௧
1 − 𝜎ො ቇ
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 ቆ
𝛿መ௙௧ + 𝛽መ𝑞෤௙௧ −  𝛼ො𝑝෤௙௧
1 − 𝜎ො ቇ
ி
௙ୀଵ
= 0 
?̃?௜௧ − ?̃?௜|௚௧
ቆ∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 ቆ
𝛿መ௙௧ + 𝛽መ𝑞෤௙௧ − 𝛼ො𝑝෤௙௧
1 − 𝜎ො ቇ
ி
௙ୀଵ ቇ
ଵିఙෝ
1 + ቆ∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 ቆ
𝛿መ௙௧ + 𝛽መ𝑞෤௙௧ −  𝛼ො𝑝෤௙௧
1 − 𝜎ො ቇ
ி
௙ୀଵ ቇ
ଵିఙෝ = 0 
𝑞෤௜௧் = ቊ
𝛽መ𝑁௧ ?̃?௜
2𝛼ො𝑘෨௜
,
𝛽መ𝑁௧
2𝛼ො𝑘௜௧
𝑠௜௧ ቆ1 −
(𝜎ො𝑠௝௧/௚ + (1 − 𝜎ො)𝑠௝௧)
(1 − 𝜎ො𝑠௝௧/௚ − (1 − 𝜎ො)𝑠௝௧)
ቇቋ = 0 
with 𝑞෤௜௧்  ∈ {𝐺𝑆, 𝐽𝑉} denoting the geo-split and JV equilibrium, respectively, 𝛿መ௜௧ = 𝑙𝑛 ቀ
௦೔೟
௦బ೟
ቁ −
𝜎ො𝑙𝑛(𝑠௜|௚௧)  −  𝛽መ𝑞௜௧  +   𝛼ො𝑝௜௧ denoting the fixed level of consumer valuation for an MNO that is not 
affected by the presence an NSA, and F the total number of firms in the market. 
After the system of equations has been solved, on can use the resulting prices and network quality to 
calculate consumer surplus. Total consumer surplus aggregates the net consumer valuation when 
each consumer chooses the option that maximizes utility. When demand is given by a nested logit 
model, consumer surplus in the absence of the NSA is calculated by using counterfactual prices and 
network quality: 
 𝐶𝑆no NSA ௧ =
ே೟(ଵି௦̃బ೟)
ఈෝ
𝑙𝑛 ቆ1 + ቀ∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 ቀఋ
෡೔೟ାఉ෡௤෤೔೟ିఈෝ௣෤೔೟
ଵିఙෝ
ቁி௜ ቁ
ଵିఙෝ
ቇ  (17) 
                                                          
32 For example, solving for a new equilibrium using estimated demand function and a changed ownership 
structure is a common method of simulating the effect of mergers on prices. Cf. Ivaldi and Verboven (2005). 
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Consumer surplus under the NSA is likewise calculated but using observed prices and network quality. 
 𝐶𝑆NSA ௧ =
ே೟(ଵି௦బ೟)
ఈෝ
𝑙𝑛 ቆ1 + ቀ∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 ቀఋ
෡೔೟ାఉ෡௤೔೟ିఈෝ௣೔೟
ଵିఙෝ
ቁி௜ ቁ
ଵିఙෝ
ቇ  (18) 
The difference between the two consumer surplus values indicates the impact of the NSA on 
consumer welfare. 
5. Estimation 
We apply our model to two NSAs that were implemented in the Czech Republic between TMCZ and 
O2 and that were signed in Q3-2013 and Q1-2014, respectively. 
5.1.  The Czech mobile telecommunications industry 
In the Czech Republic three operators have a nationwide mobile network: TMCZ, O2 and Vodafone 
(VF).33 O2 has contracted out the roll-out and operation of its mobile network to CETIN, though both 
firms are owned by the same investor. Market shares of the three MNOs in terms of active subscribers 
to mobile services in the period 2012-2018 are presented in Table 5-1.34 
Table 5-1: Subscriber shares of Czech MNOs 
       Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from Analysys Mason. 
Apart from the MNOs there are several other firms that are active in the provision of mobile 
telecommunication services. MNOs own their respective spectrum to operate a mobile network but 
can rent spectrum to mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs). MVNOs can therefore buy access to 
a network to offer mobile telecommunication services and to compete with MNOs. Market shares 
presented in Table 5-1 include subscribers to MVNOs who use the network of their respective host 
MNO. The total market shares of MVNOs in the Czech Republic amount to 6.2% in 2018. In the 
following, however, we will restrict attention to the three MNOs TMCZ, O2 and VF who bear the costs 
of network deployment and realize potential cost savings of network sharing. 
                                                          
33 Besides TMCZ, O2 and VF, Nordic Telecom is active in the Czech Republic as a small network operator that 
does not have a nationwide mobile network.  
34 The count of active subscribers to mobile services comprises total mobile handset and total mobile broadband 
connections and excludes subscribers who have not used their mobile account for more than three months. 
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Two NSAs were concluded between TMCZ and O2: the first in the third quarter of 2013, comprising 
network sharing of the 2G and 3G technologies; the second in the second quarter of 2014, comprising 
network sharing of the 4G technology. The NSAs cover the entire Czech Republic apart from the two 
largest cities, Prague and Brno. The purpose of the NSAs was to facilitate the consolidation of the 
existing standalone 2G/3G networks and to jointly roll-out 4G. The NSAs are implemented via a geo 
split agreement, whereby each operator is responsible for the operation of sites in one part of country, 
excluding Prague and Brno. TMCZ operates the shared network in the West of the country as the 
Master operator with O2 as the Visitor operator. O2 operates the shared network in the East of the 
country as the Master operator with TMCZ as the Visitor operator. Besides sharing sites, the geo-split 
agreement also allows each operator to independently invest in sites that will not be shared, and the 
Visitor operator can also request from the Master operator additional unilateral investments to 
increase the network quality for the Visitor operator’s subscribers. 
Cost savings realized differ between the 2G, 3G and 4G technologies. The 2G and 3G network has 
already reached maturity at the time of the signature of the 2G/3G NSA; hence, cost savings can be 
realized from the decommissioning of sites as the formation of a common grid rendered some sites to 
become redundant or to be operated. Cost savings related to the 4G technology, instead, are realized 
because each of the sharing parties needs to roll out and operate fewer sites, resulting in an avoidance 
of network duplication costs in the first place. Due to the short period between the conclusion of both 
NSAs it is empirically not possible to disentangle the effects of both NSAs. In our model we will thus 
estimate the joint effects of both NSAs, thus capturing network sharing over all available network 
technologies. 
5.2. Data 
The Structural model relies on four essential elements of data to estimate the effects of the NSAs: 
data on market shares, prices, network quality and network deployment. Based on the availability of 
data in different sources, the model will be estimated over the period Q1-2012 to Q4-2017. 
5.2.1. Analysys Mason data 
Data on market shares and prices are taken from Analysys Mason’s (AM) Telecoms Market Matrix for 
Central and Eastern Europe. This database provides quarterly data for the Czech mobile sector, broken 
down by operator, starting from Q1-2004 until Q1-2019. The proxy to derive market shares is the total 
number of active subscribers to mobile services per operator.35 This measure reflects the provision of 
mobile telecommunication services and is in line with the EC’s approach in calculating market shares 
in the telecommunications industry in some past cases.36 It approximates the probability that an 
                                                          
35 The number of subscribers to mobile services is the sum of total mobile handset and total mobile broadband 
connections. It includes prepaid and contract subscribers and excludes machine to machine connections. 
36 See Case COMP/M.6497 – Hutchison 3G Austria / Orange Austria; Case COMP/M.6992, - Hutchinson 3G UK / 
Telefonica Ireland; Case M.7018 – Telefonica Deutschland/ E-Plus; Case M.7612 – Hutchinson 3G UK / Telefonica 
UK; Case M.7758-Hutchinson 3G Italy /Wind / JV. The EC also declared in previous decisions that voice and data 
services do not constitute separate relevant markets: See: Case COMP/M.6497 – Hutchison 3G Austria / Orange 
Austria, Case COMP/M.5650 – T-Mobile/Orange, Case COMP/M.4947 – Vodafone/Tele2 Italy/Tele2 Spain; Case 
COMP/M.6992, - Hutchinson 3G UK / Telefonica Ireland; Case M.7018 – Telefonica Deutschland/ E-Plus; Case 
M.7612 – Hutchinson 3G UK / Telefonica UK; Case M.7758-Hutchinson 3G Italy /Wind / JV. 
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average CZ citizen chooses a specific operator or services. The measure for the price charged by MNOs 
is the average revenue per user (ARPU), which equals revenue derived from all services divided by the 
total number of subscribers.37 The benefit of the ARPU, compared to consumer expenditure data, is 
that it is easily available for all operators in the Czech Republic. This allows to include Vodafone, the 
third largest MNO in the Czech Republic, in the econometric analysis, which is crucial for identification. 
The shortcoming of using ARPU is that, by definition, it relates to total revenues per subscriber, which 
can depend on the usage by a subscriber for a given price, so ARPU may reflect changes in the 
composition of consumption rather than real price changes. 
5.2.2. Ookla data 
The proxy for network quality is the average download speed experienced by the users of mobile 
networks. Data on download speed is obtained from the data provider Ookla, a leading mobile 
internet data provider.38 Ookla hosts a platform that allows mobile network users to conduct speed 
tests and thus allows to represent actual customer experience of a network. Users can test their 
mobile internet connection through a mobile browser or by downloading the Ookla application on 
their mobile phone. Each time a user runs a speed test, Ookla records the time and location of the 
test, the operator and technology being used along with several metrics, among those the average 
download speed. 
Data on mobile download speed is available per operator and access technology (2G, 3G and 4G/LTE) 
on a quarterly basis both at the disaggregated district level and the aggregated national level. Ookla 
derives download speed through the aggregation of individual user-level information by segregating 
user-samples into subsets and computing statistics on these subsets. To obtain the aggregated 
download speed over all technologies at a national level in a given year, first the individual-level 
average download speed of all tests per user in the country and year is derived. The national 
aggregated download speed is then derived by computing the average of the individual-level 
download speeds per user.39 
                                                          
37 The ARPU does not consider subscribers who have not used their mobile account for more than three months, 
as these are not active subscribers. 
38 See “http://www.speedtest.net/mobile/”, accessed on 21 January 2020. The network performance metrics 
provided by Ookla are very reliable (i.e. representative of the population) and have previously been used by the 
GSMA in their evaluation of the Hutchinson/Orange merger in Austria (see GSMA (2017)). Moreover, MNOs are 
themselves relying on Ookla data in advertising the quality of their network and benchmarking it against the 
network of competitors. 
39 With millions of tests taken each day, Ookla employs a sampling procedure to ensure that every user gets a 
fair representation in the final analysis. This means, for example, that tests from heavy testers (i.e. users who 
take multiple tests within a short period of time) and casual testers (i.e. users who test their download speed 
seldomly) are appropriately weighted (further details can be found in Ookla’s Methodology document, available 
at https://www.speedtest.net/awards/methodology, accessed on 21 January 2020). Ookla also employs various 
techniques to eliminate biases. This includes, for example, blacklisting suspicious tests, removing tests with a 
different pre-test and post-test connection type, filtering out of roaming tests (i.e. tests taken by people who 
are roaming in the Czech Republic), removing tests from MVNOs or removing tests with a latency greater than 
the 97th percentile. 
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In accordance with the level of aggregation for the price and quantity data, we consider aggregated 
download speed at the national level, which is provided by Ookla for the period from Q1-2012 to Q4-
2017 and calculated according to the Ookla sampling procedure.40 
5.2.3. Network deployment data 
Installed network capacity has an impact on network quality. If network capacity is insufficient to serve 
network traffic, holding everything else constant, increasing capacity increases the effective quality of 
the network that consumers experience. Higher network capacity can be achieved, for example, by 
adding more spectrum or by deploying more sites. Information on the number of sites with installed 
capacity for each technology was obtained for the three main MNOs, TMCZ, O2 and Vodafone over 
the period from 2012 to 2017.41 For each operator, the site data contain all the sites in the Czech 
Republic and include information on the amount of deployed spectrum and installed capacity per site, 
separated by technology (i.e. TRX for GSM, carriers for UMTS and resource blocks for LTE). For TMCZ 
and O2, the data also allows to identify whether a site is shared or not.42 Installed capacities are 
aggregated at the district level based on the location of each site. 
To estimate the effects of the NSAs, especially the sharing status of 4G/LTE sites will be important. 
4G/LTE sites are deployed after the NSA, while 2G and 3G have already been employed independently 
throughout the country before the NSA and are considered as mature technologies. Cost savings from 
network sharing are thus most likely to be realized by the sharing of 4G/LTE sites. A shared 4G site is 
defined to have at least one shared spectrum deployment in any of the available LTE spectrum bands. 
A non-shared 4G site is defined to have at no shared spectrum deployment in any of the LTE spectrum 
bands. 
5.3.  Results 
This section presents the results after implementing the described estimation steps in Sections 3.1, 
3.2 and 3.3. We start with the estimation of demand. 
5.3.1. Demand estimation 
Based on equation (2), which describes consumer demand in terms of market shares for each 
operator, it is necessary to select the explanatory and instrumental variables to be used in the 
estimation. We use the following “baseline specification” to describe consumer demand for mobile 
telecommunication services in the Czech Republic:  
 𝑙𝑛 ቀ௦೔೟
௦బ೟
ቁ = 𝜇଴ + 𝛽𝑞௜௧ − 𝛼𝑝௜௧ + 𝜎 𝑙𝑛( 𝑠௜|௚௧) + 𝜌𝑔௜௧ସீ + 𝜃௜𝜇௜ + 𝜉௜௧.  (19) 
                                                          
40 The disaggregated Ookla data at the district level is used in the reduced-form analysis presented in Section 6. 
41 This information was obtained based on public information available at http://gsmweb.cz/, enhanced with 
information received from Deutsche Telekom in the context of the European Commission case AT.40305. 
42 Installed capacity depends also on (i) density of the sites and (ii) spectrum efficiency deployment (MIMO). 
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The explanatory variables include network quality measured by average download speeds (𝑞௜), prices 
measured by the ARPU (𝑝௜௧), market shares (𝑠௜௧, 𝑠଴௧, and 𝑠௜|௚௧), an indicator for 4G coverage (𝑔௜௧ସீ), 
operator fixed effects (𝜇௜) and a constant 𝜇଴.  
The variable for 4G coverage measures the total amount of 4G spectrum in MHz that is deployed on 
shared and non-shared sites.43 This variable allows to account for the heterogeneity among TMCZ, O2 
and Vodafone in terms of their mobile network while, at the same time, allows to capture the 
evolution of demand towards more data-intensive mobile telecommunications services that require 
an increasing amount of network capacity.44  
To make sure that the demand function is estimated consistently, the endogeneity problem that arises 
from the simultaneous relationship between network quality, prices and quantities (market shares) 
needs to be accounted for. The three variables are determined jointly because network quality and 
prices affect the quantity demanded, while the quantity demanded also affects MNOs’ choices of 
network quality and prices. A total of six instruments are used in the estimation. The first three 
instruments capture the one-quarter lagged prices, within-nest market shares and network quality 
(download speed). These instruments are often used in the literature because the current period error 
term cannot influence past values of the endogenous variables.45 Two additional instruments capture 
the one-quarter lagged network quality (download speed) of each of the MNO’s two competitors. In 
the literature, it is common to use characteristics of products of rival firms as instruments, also known 
as BLP-type instruments.46 Finally, the sixth instrument captures the one-quarter lagged prices in 
Slovakia, the Czech Republic’s neighboring country. The motivation to include this instrument is that 
cost shocks should affect operators’ pricing decisions in a similar way in neighboring markets, while 
consumer preferences across neighboring markets are not necessarily correlated. Both O2 and TMCZ 
operate in Slovakia and it is possible that prices in this neighboring market can explain prices in the 
Czech Republic, for example if price changes are driven by unobserved cost shocks that are common 
in the two countries but unrelated to demand in the Czech Republic.47 These types of instruments are 
widely used in the literature and known as Hausman-type instruments.48  
Table 5-2 presents the results of the baseline estimation. Several robustness checks have been 
conducted to demonstrate that the presented results do not hinge on the inclusion of specific 
explanatory variables, instruments or estimation methods. These robustness checks are presented in 
Section 7.1, showing that the presented findings from the baseline specification can be confirmed if: 
(i) different subsets of instruments are used; (ii) an alternative measure of 4G coverage; (iii) 2G and 
                                                          
43 As shown in Section 7.1.2, results are similar if instead the number of resource blocks is used as a measure of 
4G coverage. 
44 The baseline estimation only includes an indicator for total 4G spectrum. As shown in Section 7.1.3 however, 
robustness checks also including indicators for 2G and 3G spectrum yield very similar results.  
45 See Arellano, M., & Bover, O. (1995) and Blundell, R., & Bond, S. (1998). 
46 See Berry, Levinsohn, & Pakes (1995). 
47 Vodafone is not operating in Slovakia; therefore, the price of the third large mobile network operator in 
Slovakia, Orange, is used as an instrument for the price of Vodafone in the Czech Republic. Even though Orange 
and Vodafone are different operators, the price of Orange in Slovakia is highly correlated with the price of 
Vodafone in the Czech Republic with a correlation coefficient of 0.84, thus satisfying the relevance condition. 
48 See Nevo (2000). 
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3G coverage is additionally included; (iv) year fixed effects are included; (v) data traffic is used as a 
proxy for 4G coverage; and (vi) no instruments are used and the model is estimated with simple OLS. 
Table 5-2: Demand function estimates 
  
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Operator fixed effects are relative to O2, the omitted MNO. 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
As predicted by economic theory, the demand for mobile telecommunication services depends 
negatively on price and positively on the level of network quality (i.e. average download speed). In 
addition, the 4G coverage coefficient is positive and significant. The coefficient of the within group 
market shares represents the degree to which customers prefer one of the main operators, as 
opposed to the outside option. Its value of 0.83 is relatively high but different from 1, suggesting that 
consumers who decide to contract with one of the main operators are unlikely to switch to the outside 
option. Since there are more instruments than endogenous variables, one can conduct the Hansen-
Sargan test of over identification, testing the null hypothesis that the instruments are exogenous. The 
p-value associated with this test is 0.141, implying that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.49 
Following the demand estimation, it is possible to calculate various metrics that shed more light on 
consumer demand. First, note that consumers’ willingness to pay for quality can be computed by the 
ratio of the coefficients for download speed over the coefficient for price (ఉ
ఈ
). This ratio expresses the 
willingness-to-pay for one additional Mbit\s of download speed to derive the same level of utility. It is 
                                                          
49 At least four instruments are needed for the estimation and the corresponding implementation of the Hansen-
Sargan test. Different subsets of the instruments used in the baseline model display similar results. However, it 
seems that the inclusion of the lagged within-nest market share is needed in order to identify the nest coefficient 
𝜎. The results are robust to using different combinations of instruments, as presented in Section 7.1.1. 
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given by 0.66 €
ெ௕௜௧௦/௦
, indicating that a representative user is willing to pay €0.66 for one additional 
Mbit/s of download speed. 
Second, Table 5-3 reports the average own and cross-price elasticity of demand for each MNO, 
resulting from the demand specification. Average demand elasticities are reported before the NSAs 
were signed (i.e. before Q1-2014) and after the NSAs were signed (i.e. after Q1-2014) to analyze 
whether the implementation of the NSAs went along with a change in demand elasticities.50 Own-
price elasticities for all MNOs are negative and above 1 in absolute value before Q1-2014. After Q1-
2014, own-price elasticities became smaller in absolute value, indicating that consumers are getting 
less responsive to price changes over time. This finding can be explained by the increasing importance 
of mobile telecommunication services for consumers over time, as will be shown in Table 5-4. Cross-
price elasticities of demand for all MNOs are positive but are also becoming smaller after Q1-2014, 
indicating that consumers are getting less responsive to price changes over time. This finding is in line 
with the observed pattern for own-price elasticities.  
Table 5-3: Own and cross-price elasticities of demand 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
Third, Table 5-4 reports the average own- and cross-elasticities of demand with respect to a change in 
quality for each MNO.51 Own-quality elasticities of demand for all MNOs are positive and are 
increasing over time, which is expected because mobile download speed is getting more important. 
Cross-quality elasticities of demand for all MNOs are negative and are increasing over time in absolute 
value, which indicates that consumers are becoming more responsive to changes in network quality. 
This finding again supports the intuition that download speed becomes more important for consumers 
over time. 
                                                          
50 In the nested logit model framework, the formula for the own-price elasticity of demand is given by 𝜂௜௜ =
− ఈෝ
ଵିఙෝ
𝑝௜௧൫1 − 𝜎ො𝑠௜|௚௧ − (1 − 𝜎ො)𝑠௜௧൯; the formula for the cross-price elasticity of demand for firm j with respect to a change 
in price of firm I is given by 𝜂௝௜ =
ఈෝ
ଵିఙෝ
𝑝௜௧൫𝜎ො𝑠௜|௚௧ − (1 − 𝜎ො)𝑠௜௧൯. 
51 In the nested logit model framework, the formula for the own-elasticity of demand with respect to quality is given by 𝜅௜௜ =
ఉ෡
ଵିఙෝ
𝑞௜௧൫1 − 𝜎ො𝑠௜|௚௧ − (1 − 𝜎ො)𝑠௜௧൯; the formula for the cross-elasticity of demand for firm j with respect to a change in quality 
of firm i is given by 𝜅௝௜ = −
ఉ෡
ଵିఙෝ
𝑞௜௧൫𝜎ො𝑠௜|௚௧ − (1 − 𝜎ො)𝑠௜௧൯. 
Operator NSA TMCZ O2 Vodafone
O2 -1.95 1.12 - 0.71
TMCZ -1.92 - 1.14 0.71
Vodafone -2.50 1.12 1.14 -
O2 -1.47 0.86 - 0.55
TMCZ -1.39 - 0.85 0.55
Vodafone -1.98 0.86 0.85 -
Own price 
elasticity
Cross price elasticity
with respect to a price change by
Before
After
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Table 5-4: Own and cross elasticities of demand for network quality 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
5.3.2. Cost estimation 
As explained in Section 4.2, MNO’s marginal costs of providing access to the network 𝑐௜௧ (quantity 
cost) as well as MNO’s quality cost parameter 𝑘௜௧ can be recovered after the estimation of demand. 
In this section, we provide an econometric specification that describe how these costs depend on each 
MNO’s deployed network. We use the following “baseline specification” for marginal quantity costs: 
𝑐௜௧ = 𝑐଴ + 𝜃௜𝜇௜ + 𝛾 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟௧ + 𝜙 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟௧ 
+𝜌௦௛௔௥௘ௗ𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠௜௧ସீ + 𝜌௡௢௡௦௛௔௥௘ௗ𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠௜௧ସீ + 𝑀𝑇𝑅௧ + 𝜔௜௧.   (20) 
The explanatory variables include firm, year and quarterly fixed effects, the number of shared and 
non-shared 4G sites of operator I and period t (𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠௜௧ସீ, 𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠௜௧ସீ) and mobile 
termination rates at period t that are common to all operators (𝑀𝑇𝑅௧). 
The baseline specification explains quantity costs in terms of the number of shared and non-shared 
4G sites and additional explanatory variables. Firm fixed effects are important to control for firm-
specific factors affecting costs that are constant over time. Year fixed effects are important to control 
for unobserved factors affecting costs in a given year common to all firms and could capture trends in 
costs over time. Mobile termination rates are important as they are a direct driver of firms’ costs. 
Most importantly, and as explained in Section 4.3, the baseline specification identifies whether the 
NSAs generated cost reductions for TMCZ and O2, compared to Vodafone that exclusively operated a 
non-shared network. This is achieved by testing whether there is a difference in costs between 
installing capacity in shared and non-shared 4G sites.52 Intuitively, capacity deployed in shared sites 
could result in a cost advantage compared to deployment in a non-shared site, for example, because 
the same number of customers could be served by a lower number of independent sites. The 
presented baseline regression thus allows to directly measure the cost effects of network sharing by 
relying on information on the number of shared and non-shared sites. 
A similar procedure is used to estimate the quality costs parameter. The baseline specification is 
expressed as follows: 
                                                          
52 Because the deployment of 2G and 3G was already completed at the time the NSAs were signed, the costs of 
installing 2G/3G capacity are covered or sunk. Therefore, differences in costs between shared and non-shared 
sites when installing 2G/3G capacity are not taken into account. 
Operator NSA TMCZ O2 Vodafone
O2 0.09 -0.10 - -0.06
TMCZ 0.18 - -0.05 -0.06
Vodafone 0.22 -0.10 -0.05 -
O2 0.57 -0.38 - -0.28
TMCZ 0.61 - -0.33 -0.28
Vodafone 1.00 -0.38 -0.33 -
Own 
quality 
elasticity
Cross quality elasticitiy
with respect to quality change by
Before
After
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 𝑘௜௧் = 𝑐଴ + 𝜃௜𝜇௜ + 𝛾𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟௧ + 𝜌௦௛௔௥௘ௗ𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠௜௧ସீ  
  +𝜌௡௢௡௦௛௔௥௘ௗ𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠௜௧ସீ + 𝑀𝑇𝑅௧ + 𝜔௜௧.   (21) 
with 𝑇 ∈ {𝐺𝑆, JV} indicating the quality cost parameter in the geo-split and JV equilibrium, 
respectively. Compared to the estimation of marginal costs of providing access to the network 𝑐௜௧, it 
is not necessary to include quarter fixed effects because the quality cost parameter 𝑘௜௧்  shows no 
pattern of seasonality. 
Table 5-5 presents the results of the baseline cost estimations. Several robustness checks have been 
implemented to demonstrate that the presented results do not hinge on the inclusion of specific 
explanatory variables or estimation methods. These robustness checks are presented in Section 7.2 
and show that the results can be confirmed if: (i) trends or period fixed effects are used instead of 
year fixed effects and (ii) the effect of the NSA is identified alternatively by using an operator-specific 
dummy after Q1-2014 instead of exploiting differences in the number of sites.  
Column (1) of Table 5-5 shows the results of the regression of marginal quantity costs 𝑐௜௧; while 
columns (2) and (3) show the results of the regressions of the quality cost parameter in the geo-split 
and JV equilibrium, respectively. Costs are estimated over the period Q1-2013 until Q4-2017 as this is 
the period when information on both shared on non-shared 4G sites is available.53  
Table 5-5: Baseline cost regressions 
 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Operator fixed effects are relative to O2, the omitted MNO. 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
                                                          
53 In contrast to the demand estimation presented in Section 5.3.1, we do not include 2012 in the estimation 
because there were no shared 4G sites in 2012 that would allow us to observe a differential impact of shared vs. 
nonshared 4G sites on costs. 
(1) (2) (3)
Marginal cost 
per user
Quality cost 
parameter 
(competitive eq.)
Quality cost 
parameter (hyrid 
eq.)
Shared 4G sites 1.136*** 0.0379** 0.0714***
(3.66) (2.18) (3.94)
Non-shared 4G sites 2.307*** 0.107*** 0.157***
(4.98) (3.67) (5.16)
MTR 8.175*** 0.172* 0.170*
(6.64) (1.83) (1.80)
Operator FE:
   TMCZ -2.023*** -0.0883*** -0.0937***
(-6.32) (-3.96) (-4.07)
   Vodafone 3.238*** -0.304*** -0.293***
(4.61) (-6.35) (-5.84)
Constant 3.487* 0.189 0.175
(1.90) (1.39) (1.30)
Observations 60 60 60
Adj. R² 0.960 0.830 0.843
Quarter fixed effects Yes No No
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
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The baseline cost estimations show that the costs of deploying an additional non-shared 4G site is 
always more expensive than deploying an additional shared 4G site - in fact roughly twice as 
expensive. These results confirm that the cost savings for TMCZ and O2 are generated through 
network sharing, by using shared instead of non-shared sites. The model thus identifies the 
mechanism by which network sharing generates cost efficiencies. In addition, the model can be used 
to predict how costs would have developed if the NSAs had not been in place, as explained in Section 
4.3. 
After having obtained an estimate for the quality cost parameter 𝑘௜௧் , we performed a Vuong test to 
test whether the geo-split or the JV equilibrium provides a more realistic representation of the data 
generating process. This test is a non-nested model selection test used to assess which type of quality 
cost parameter fits the observed data better and is thus more likely to correspond to the true model 
of competition. The obtained Vuong test statistic is 0.34, suggesting that the two types of equilibria 
are statistically not distinguishable.54 As a consequence, to clarify which equilibrium model is more 
likely to be the true one, both quality cost parameters are used to simulate the counterfactual 
equilibrium to assess which equilibrium yields more realistic results. 
5.3.3. Geo-split equilibrium 
This section presents the results after simulating the counterfactual equilibrium, assuming that MNOs 
do not coordinate on network quality to maximize joint efforts, but that each MNO independently 
sets the profit-maximizing level of network quality, resulting in a quality cost parameter presented by 
equation (10). This means that counterfactual marginal quantity costs ?̃?௜௧ and counterfactual costs of 
providing network quality 𝑘෨௜௧
௃௏ are derived based on the results of the baseline demand and cost 
estimation. Counterfactual costs are then used to solve for the corresponding equilibrium 
counterfactual prices, market shares and network quality. 
Because Vodafone does not participate in the NSAs and therefore does not deploy shared sites, our 
model predicts that its counterfactual costs are equal to its actual costs. In reality, Vodafone’s quantity 
costs could also be affected because the NSAs could change Vodafone’s investment decisions in 
network infrastructure. Infrastructure investments are likely to be strategic complements, implying 
that Vodafone’s reaction to the implementation of the NSA would have been to also increase its own 
level of network deployment. If this is true, Vodafone’s marginal costs in the counterfactual scenario 
                                                          
54 The Vuong test is asymptotically follows a standard normal distribution with a critical value at a 95% level of 
significance of |1.96|. A value of the Voung test smaller than |1.96| suggest that the two competing models of 
competition are statistically not distinguishable. It should be noted, though that the sample size of the Vuong 
test in this case was 60 observations, which might be too small to guarantee that the test statistic approximately 
follows a standard normal distribution.  
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without the NSAs in place would have been higher because economies of scale, scope and density 
would be harder to realize.55,56 
Evidence that Vodafone’s costs are also affected by the NSAs is found by computing the counterfactual 
equilibrium, adjusting TMCZ’s and O2’s (i.e. ?̃?௜௧ and 𝑘෨௜௧
௃௏) counterfactual costs as described but keeping 
Vodafone’s costs unchanged. Figure 5-1 depicts the resulting counterfactual download speed for each 
MNO in this scenario. It can be observed that the resulting counterfactual download speed for each 
operator if no NSA had been signed is unrealistic, predicting that TMCZ’s and O2’s download speed 
had decreased by 79% and 76%, respectively, to near zero levels, while download speed of Vodafone 
had increased by 176%. This unrealistic result shows that there exists no credible counterfactual 
scenario that features higher counterfactual costs of TMCZ and O2, without adjusting for a Vodafone’s 
costs. 
Figure 5-1: Counterfactual download speed (geo-split equilibrium, Vodafone costs unchanged) 
 
Notes: The first dashed line refers to the signing date of 2G/3G NSA, the second line to the signing date of the 
4G/LTE NSA. 
 Source: Author’s analysis. 
                                                          
55 For instance, Briglauer et al. (2016) use firm-level panel data to examine the impact of service-based and 
facility-based competition on firm-level investment in the fixed broadband industry. The dataset contains 
information of 57 operators based in 23 EU countries during the period 2003-2012. Based on the impact of the 
incumbents and entrants infrastructure stock on firm’s levels of investments, the authors argue that investments 
in infrastructure seem to be strategic complements. In a similar vein, Grajek and Röller (2012) find evidence of 
strategic complementarity of investments (but from entrants to incumbents only), as incumbents seem to invest 
more in response to investment increases of entrants. The dataset used covers more than 70 fixed-line telecom 
operators in 20 EU member states during the period 1997-2006. 
56 We do not model MNOs investments in network infrastructure but instead describe how network capacity 
would have been deployed by taking the total level of capacity, resulting from investments in infrastructure, as 
given. A potential extension of the model could allow firms to choose the number of shares/non-shared sites at 
the same time as choosing quality and prices. Due to the evidence of strategic complementarities in investments 
in network infrastructure in the literature, we do believe, however, that this increased level of complexity is not 
necessary to anticipate the effects of NSAs on the costs of outsiders to the NSAs. 
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For this reason, the counterfactual equilibrium in prices and network quality is derived by assuming 
that counterfactual quantity and quality costs for Vodafone would have been affected by a similar 
magnitude as the costs for TMCZ and O2. Specifically, based on the cost estimation, the average 
increase in marginal costs of quantity for TMCZ and O2 in the absence of the NSA is estimated to be 
40.4% and 33.6%, respectively. We thus assume that Vodafone’s marginal costs of quantity would also 
have been 33% higher in the absence of the NSAs.57 We further assume that Vodafone’s quality cost 
parameter 𝑘෨௜௧ீௌ would have been higher in the absence of the NSAs, in line with the prediction for the 
quality cost parameter of TMCZ and O2 demonstrated in Table 5-5. Section 7.3 shows that the 
qualitative results are robust to different assumptions on the change in 𝑘෨௜௧ீௌ; for the presentation of 
the baseline results we assume that the counterfactual quality cost parameter 𝑘෨௜௧ீௌ for all MNOs would 
be 20% higher than the derived quality cost parameter 𝑘௜௧.58 
Higher costs in the absence of the NSA for TMCZ and O2 result in higher prices being charged. Figure 
5-2 displays the estimated counterfactual equilibrium prices for all MNOs. On average, prices for 
TMCZ, O2 and Vodafone would be 14.8%, 14.6% and 12.5% higher without the NSAs, respectively. 
Figure 5-2: Development of observed and counterfactual prices 
 
Notes: The first dashed line refers to the signing date of 2G/3G NSA, the second line to the signing date of the 
4G/LTE NSA. 
 Source: Author’s analysis. 
Figure 5-3 displays the estimated counterfactual network quality for all MNOs. It can be observed that 
counterfactual levels of network quality do not take unrealistic values if it is assumed that Vodafone’s 
costs are also affected by the NSA. On average, network quality for TMCZ, O2 and Vodafone would be 
11.3%, 9.8% and 44.3% lower, respectively. 
                                                          
57 As it turns out, the smallest possible increase in costs for Vodafone that allows convergence to a counterfactual 
equilibrium is 33%. In other words, there cannot exist a counterfactual scenario with higher costs for TMCZ and 
O2 of 40.4% and 33.6% respectively, without observing an increase in costs for Vodafone of at least 33%. 
58 Specifically, qualitative results remain unchanged for changes of 𝑘෨௜௧ீௌ in the range of 5% and 30%. 
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Figure 5-3: Development of observed and counterfactual network quality 
 
Notes: The first dashed line refers to the signing date of 2G/3G NSA, the second line to the signing date of the 
4G/LTE NSA. 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
Finally, in terms of consumer welfare, consumers would have been worse off without the NSAs. 
Applying the formulas for consumer surplus presented in equations (17) and (18) shows that consumer 
surplus per quarter would have been on average 5.9% lower (or equivalently, an average of €111.1 
million. per quarter).59 
5.3.4. JV equilibrium 
This section presents the results after simulating the counterfactual equilibrium, assuming that the 
NSAs lead TMCZ and O2 to set their network qualities to maximize joint profits. Prices continue to be 
set by firms to maximize their own profits. Counterfactual marginal quantity costs ?̃?௜௧ and 
counterfactual costs of providing network quality 𝑘෨௜௧
௃௏ are derived based on the results of the baseline 
demand and cost estimation and these counterfactual costs are then used to solve for the 
corresponding equilibrium counterfactual prices, market shares and network quality.  
If Vodafone’s counterfactual costs are assumed to be unchanged in the absence of the NSA, a similar 
unrealistic equilibrium to the one presented in Section 5.3.3 emerges. As shown in Figure 5-4, for the 
case in which NSA parties are assumed to jointly choose qualities post Q1-2014, the resulting 
counterfactual download speeds are unrealistic. Predicted average changes in download speeds for 
O2, TMCZ and Vodafone are equal to -54.6%, -70.6% and 169.7%, respectively. This unrealistic result 
again shows that there exists no credible counterfactual scenario that features higher counterfactual 
costs of TMCZ and O2, without adjusting for a Vodafone’s costs. 
                                                          
59 The difference in consumer surplus of €111.1 million per quarter results in a total difference of €1.8 billion 
over the four-year post-NSA period under investigation from Q1-2014 to Q4-2017 that is stated in the 
introduction. 
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Figure 5-4: Counterfactual download speed (JV equilibrium, Vodafone costs unchanged) 
 
Notes: The first dashed line refers to the signing date of 2G/3G NSA, the second line to the signing date of the 
4G/LTE NSA. 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
In the JV equilibrium case, however, a realistic counterfactual equilibrium also does not emerge if 
Vodafone’s counterfactual costs are adjusted. Analogous as in Section 5.3.3, the average increase in 
marginal costs of quantity ?̃?௜௧ for TMCZ and O2 in the absence of the NSA is estimated to be 40.4% and 
33.6%, respectively and we assume that Vodafone’s marginal costs of quantity would also have been 
33% higher in the absence of the NSAs. In addition, as in Section 5.3.3, an exogenous shock for the 
cost parameter of quality has been introduced for all operators. In the JV equilibrium case, however, 
the counterfactual equilibrium does not converge unless it is assumed that the quality costs 
parameters 𝑘෨௜௧
௃௏ would have been much higher in the absence of the NSAs.60 Figure 5-5 displays the 
resulting counterfactual download speeds when the quality cost parameters are increased by a factor 
of 1.94. As it can be seen in the figure, these results are unrealistic, as the predicted average download 
speed provided for Vodafone is estimated to approach zero after Q1-2014. 
These results provide empirical support for the fact that the Czech NSA is not organized as a joint 
venture agreement, meaning that TMCZ and O2 are not coordinating on the profit-maximizing choice 
of network quality. Instead because the NSA is organized as a geo-splitting agreement, it is not 
surprising that the structural model does not yield realistic results if this behavioral assumption is 
imposed in the MNOs in the Czech telecommunications market. The results together with the results 
of the Vuong test presented in Section 5.3.2 are taken as evidence that TMCZ and O2 are not jointly 
setting network quality and that the Czech mobile telecommunications market is characterized by a 
geo-split equilibrium. 
                                                          
60 The system of equations presented in Section 4.3 does not converge unless it is assumed that 𝑘෨௜௧
௃௏  increases 
by a factor of at least 1.94. 
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Figure 5-5: Counterfactual download speed (JV equilibrium, similar cost increase) 
 
Notes: The first dashed line refers to the signing date of 2G/3G NSA, the second line to the signing date of the 
4G/LTE NSA. 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
6. Reduced-form evidence 
The results in Section 5 show that our structural model of network sharing, when applied to the mobile 
telecommunications industry in the Czech Republic, predicts that network sharing organized by a geo-
splitting agreement resulted in higher network quality. We assumed that network operators compete 
in network quality by directly choosing the optimal level of quality. This is a simplifying assumption as 
in reality network operators invest in network infrastructure, which consequently determines the level 
of network quality. 
This section presents the results of a reduced-form analysis of network quality demonstrating that the 
finding of increased network quality after the implementation of the Czech NSA is not driven by the 
behavioral assumptions adopted in the structural model. 
6.1. Data 
As in the structural model, we use download speed to measure the actual customer experience of 
network quality. Data on download speed is obtained from the data provider Ookla, a leading mobile 
internet data provider. In contrast to the analysis in the structural model, the reduced-form analysis 
is based on disaggregated data at the district level, which is available on a quarterly basis by operator 
and access technology (2G, 3G and 4G/LTE).61 
Table 6-1 shows the difference in average download speed for each MNO in the Czech Republic before 
and after the implementation of the NSA. This simple temporal comparison shows that unsurprisingly 
customers’ experienced download speed increased over time. TMCZ’s average download speed 
                                                          
61 The Ookla dataset is explained in more detail in Section 5.2.2. 
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increased by 397.0% in the period after the NSA, while O2’s and Vodafone’s download speed increased 
by 709.2% and 499.3%, respectively. 
Table 6-1: Average download speed by operator and period 
 
Notes: “Before NSA” corresponds to the average download speed in the period Q1-2011 – Q4-2013. “After NSA” 
corresponds to the period Q1-2014 – Q2-2019. 
Source: Author’s analysis based on Ookla data. 
Based on the descriptive statistics in Table 6-1, no conclusions on the causal effects of the NSA on 
quality can be drawn. To identify the effects of the NSA it is necessary to implement a regression 
analysis that allows controlling for different factors affecting the evolution of download speed over 
time. 
6.2. Estimation results 
To identify the impact of the NSAs on quality a before-after comparison by means of a regression 
analysis is performed. A dummy variable takes the value 0 before the implementation of the NSA and 
1 when the NSA is signed (i.e. in Q1-2014), while other exogenous factors affecting network quality 
are controlled for.62 
Actual download speed is contingent on numerous different factors. Network coverage, network 
capacity and the functionality of the RAN affect download speed and are under direct control of the 
network operators. Other factors such as the quality of internet ad content servers, population 
density, weather or topological characteristics can hardly be influenced by the operators. Finally, 
download speed crucially depends on network traffic, which is a function of the number of subscribers 
of an operator, price and other factors. 
To account for these factors, we estimate the following equation:63 
                                                          
62 Applying a DID method is not possible here because we do not have data for a suitable control group that is 
unaffected by the NSA. Vodafone is not a suitable benchmark as it is a key competitor in the Czech market and 
strategically reacts to the NSA by also investing in network infrastructure. The districts of Prague and Brno are 
also not a suitable benchmark, even though they are not part of the NSA. The 4G/LTE technology was rolled out 
on a large scale by all MNOs in the years 2013 and 2014, starting in Prague and Brno. This timing coincides with 
the signing of the NSA. It is thus not possible to isolate the effects of the NSAs from the effect of the 4G/LTE 
technology rollout. 
63 As far as we know, there is no available article that provides a model of how effective network quality is 
determined. The specification is motivated by models of quality proposed by GSMA (2017). 
Operator Period
-----Mbit/s----- -----%-----
Before NSA 5.71
After NSA 28.37
Before NSA 2.75
After NSA 22.24 0.00
Before NSA 5.45
After NSA 32.66
Vodafone
Czech Republic
397.0
709.2
499.3
TMCZ
O2
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ln൫𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑ௗ,௢,௧൯ =  𝛼 +  𝛽ଵ ∗ 𝑁𝑆𝐴ଶ଴ଵସொ + 𝛽ଶ ∗ 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 2𝐺ௗ,௢,௧ + 𝛽ଷ ∗ 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 3𝐺ௗ,௢,௧ +  𝛽ସ
∗ 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 4𝐺ௗ,௢,௧  + 𝛽ହ ∗ 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡ௗ,௧𝛽଺ ∗ ln൫𝐴𝑅𝑃𝑈௢,௧ିଵ൯ + 𝛽଻
∗ ln൫𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠௢,௧ିଵ൯ +  𝛽଼ ∗ ln(𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐௧ିଵ) +  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑௧ + 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑²௧ + 𝐷௔௥௘௔
+  𝐷ௗ + 𝐷௢ +  𝜀ௗ,௢,௧ 
where for district d, operator o at time t: ln൫𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑ௗ,௢,௧൯ is the logarithm of quarterly average 
download speed; 𝑁𝑆𝐴ଶ଴ଵସொଵ is a dummy variable equal to one post NSA (i.e. post Q4-2013) and zero 
otherwise; 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 2𝐺ௗ,௢,௧ , 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 3𝐺ௗ,௢,௧ , 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 4𝐺ௗ,௢,௧ are the annual sums of deployed 
spectrum of the respective technology; 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡ௗ,௧ the annual unemployment rate; 
ln൫𝐴𝑅𝑃𝑈௢,௧ିଵ൯ is the natural logarithm of the one-period lagged quarterly average revenue per user; 
ln൫𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠௢,௧ିଵ൯ is the natural logarithm of the one-period lagged quarterly number of active 
subscribers; ln (𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐௧ିଵ) is the natural logarithm of the one-period lagged total data traffic 
in the Czech Republic; 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑௧ is a linear trend variable; 𝐷௔௥௘௔are area fixed effects (Prague & Brno, 
East, West); 𝐷ௗ are district fixed effects and 𝐷௢ are operator fixed effects. 
The variable of interest is 𝑁𝑆𝐴. The coefficient associated with this dummy variable measures the 
change in average download speed resulting from the NSAs after controlling for other factors affecting 
download speed. As explained above, download speed is contingent on the capacity that is available 
to the user. The variables Capacity 2G, Capacity 3G, and Capacity 4G therefore control for per capita 
capacity available.64 Fixed effects are used to control for unobserved heterogeneity between areas, 
districts and operators. As the data on capacity by operator is available for 2012-2017 only, the 
estimation is limited to this time period.65  
The results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 6-2 below. The baseline specification, 
based on an NSA dummy that takes the value ‘1’ post Q4-2013, is presented as specification (1). The 
results show that download speed increased after the implementation of the NSA, after controlling 
for major other substantial factors that affect download speed.66 The coefficient of the variable for 4G 
capacity is positive, which indicates that the introduction of the 4G/LTE technology had a positive 
effect on average download speed. The negative coefficient for 3G capacity can be explained by 
refarming, i.e. the repurposing of frequency band. With the introduction of the 4G/LTE technology, 
3G spectrum decreased due to refarming to 4G.  
The positive coefficient for ARPU indicates a higher willingness to pay for higher network quality. The 
negative coefficient for the total number of active subscribers captures the effect of network 
congestion, which negatively influences network quality. The fact that the trend variable is statistically 
significant indicates that there are factors besides the roll out of the 4G/LTE technology that positively 
affect network quality. One explanation could be that more consumers preferred a tariff that enabled 
high speed internet, or that more consumers switched to handsets capable of higher speeds. The 
squared trend variable captures nonlinear patterns in the evolution of download speed. Finally, the 
                                                          
64 Per capita capacities are calculated as the sum of total spectrum deployed by technology, operator and district, 
divided by the total population of the respective district.  
65 Standard errors are clustered at the operator-district level to account for autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity. 
66 The effect of the NSA dummy variable is calculated using the “Kennedy transformation” and presented in the 
last row of Table 6-2. Kennedy (1981) showed that a consistent and unbiased estimator is given 
by [exp (δ෠)/exp(0.5 (V෡൫δ෠൯))]-1 with δ෠ the OLS estimator of δ and V෡൫δ෠൯ its estimated variance.  
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positive operator fixed effects for O2 and TMCZ indicate that the Parties to the NSA on average provide 
a higher download speed than Vodafone. The area fixed effects indicate that average download speed 
in the East and West is lower than in the cities of Prague and Brno, which serve as the baseline areas. 
Table 6-2: Estimation results 
 
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p <0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Operator fixed effects are relative to 
O2, the omitted MNO. 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
Specifications (2) to (7) present robustness checks of the baseline specification. All specifications show 
that download speed increased after the implementation of the NSA, independently of the introduced 
changes in the specification of the econometric model. Specification (2) presents a fixed effects 
regression that uses the full set of district-operator fixed effects, instead of separately controlling for 
operator and area fixed effects. Specification (3) assumes that the effect of the NSA as explained by 
the NSA dummy starts post Q2-2014 instead of post Q4-2013, to capture the starting point of the 
ln(Speed) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
NSA 0.197*** 0.191*** 0.302*** 0.187*** 0.257*** 0.203*** 0.232***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.027) (0.030) (0.031)
2G spectrum (Mhz) 61.977 81.898** 79.226* 146.187*** 154.847*** 49.71 68.483
(41.919) (39.531) (40.866) (40.037) (42.256) (41.220) (41.685)
3G spectrum (Mhz) -19.099*** -26.794*** -19.612*** -19.652*** -16.785*** -19.093*** -19.503***
(5.523) (8.353) (5.532) (5.671) (5.912) (5.559) (5.520)
4G spectrum (Mhz) 15.755*** 12.403*** 14.075*** 14.078*** 11.029*** 16.505*** 16.136***
(1.967) (2.112) (1.908) (1.916) (1.955) (1.889) (1.949)
ln(ARPU), lagged 0.885*** 0.820*** 0.374*** 0.509*** -0.885*** 0.901*** 0.944***
(0.103) (0.103) (0.114) (0.092) (0.088) (0.103) (0.106)
-1.313*** -1.334*** -1.138*** -1.486*** -1.228*** -1.326*** -1.334***
(0.313) (0.313) (0.315) (0.317) (0.312) (0.313) (0.314)
0.309*** 0.344*** 0.332*** -0.796*** 0.642*** 0.320*** 0.387***
(0.116) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.028) (0.116) (0.111)
Unemployment rate -0.037*** -0.040*** -0.030*** -0.026** -0.003 -0.032***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Operator FE:
O2 0.401** 0.278 0.452** 0.223 0.410** 0.414**
(0.175) (0.177) (0.177) (0.173) (0.175) (0.175)
TMCZ 0.574*** 0.438** 0.623*** 0.356* 0.582*** 0.589***
(0.183) (0.186) (0.186) (0.181) (0.184) (0.183)
Area FE:
East -0.445*** -0.458*** -0.469*** -0.463*** -7.432 -0.313
(0.050) (0.051) (0.049) (0.052) (4.650) (0.440)
West -0.278*** -0.311*** -0.318*** -0.381*** -7.169 -0.226
(0.059) (0.058) (0.059) (0.060) (4.588) (0.451)
Trend 0.189*** 0.184*** 0.142*** 0.204*** 0.188*** 0.181***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
Trend² -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Population density -0.003
(0.002)
GDP per capita 0.000
(0.000)
Constant 10.675* 10.595* 9.660* 38.820*** 9.337* 17.732** 8.658*
(5.789) (5.914) (5.775) (5.634) (4.509) (7.542) (5.776)
Observations 5540 5540 5540 5540 5540 5540 5540
Adj. R² 0.851 0.861 0.856 0.847 0.839 0.851 0.851
District fixed effects Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District-operator fixed effectsNo Yes No No No No No
NSA effect 21.7 % 21.03 % 35.15 % 20.55 % 29.22 % 22.41 % 26.06 %0.847 0.839 0.851 0.851
ln(Subscribers), 
lagged
ln(Total data 
traffic), lagged
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4G/LTE NSA instead of the 2G/3G NSA. The results show that the estimated NSA effect is even higher 
in this case, which is unsurprising since the 4G/LTE NSA enabled the Parties to extend their 4G/LTE 
coverage much faster than what had been possible without the NSAs. Specification (4) and (5) present 
the results after removing the squared trend and the trend variable from the regression model, 
respectively. The fact that both trend variables are statistically significant in specification (1) indicated 
that above and beyond the included control variables there are factors affecting download speed that 
are not captured by the model. This finding is confirmed as in specification (5), without the inclusion 
of trend variables, the NSA dummy seems to capture some of these factors, resulting in a higher 
estimated effect of the NSA. Finally, specifications (6) and (7) present the results after including 
additional control variables of population density and the Czech unemployment rate, respectively. 
Both variables are not statistically significant, suggesting that their effect is already captured by the 
other explanatory variables. 
To summarize, the results of the reduced-form analysis on network quality confirm the results of the 
structural model that the introduction of the NSA resulted in an increase in download speed for all 
mobile network operators in the Czech Republic. The analysis controls for the effects of the main 
driving forces of network quality and therefore provides direct evidence that the increase in download 
speed after the introduction of the NSA is causally linked to the NSA. 
7. Structural model: Robustness checks 
7.1.  Robustness checks of the demand estimation 
This section presents the robustness checks performed to validate the correctness of results obtained 
by the baseline estimation, presented in Section 5. 
7.1.1. Different choice of instruments 
Table 7-1 contains the estimates of the baseline demand specification but considering different 
subsets of instruments. As seen in the table, results are robust to different specifications. The only 
instrument that needs to be considered across all specifications is the lag of the market share within 
group, as this variable seems to be required in order to properly identify the estimated value of 𝜎. 
Indeed, when removing this variable from the set of instruments, the estimated value of 𝜎 becomes 
non-significant, higher than one or negative in most of the specifications and hence does not satisfy 
basic economic principles.67  
                                                          
67 In addition, when removing the lag of market share within group from specification (4), the estimated own-
price elasticities become on average lower than one, which results in predicted marginal costs lower than zero. 
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Table 7-1: Demand estimates with subset of instruments 
 
Notes: t-values in parentheses. * p <0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. In subtable (B), the lags of download speeds of 
competitors have been included as instruments. Operator fixed effects are relative to O2, the omitted MNO. 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
7.1.2. Alternative measure of 4G coverage 
This baseline specification is replicated but using the number of resource blocks as control for 4G 
coverage in Table 7-2. The resulting estimated coefficients for the relevant parameters of the model 
remain within similar order of magnitudes compared to the baseline model.  
In this case, however, in specifications (1), (2) and (3) one cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
instruments are valid, but only either at the 1% or 5% levels. In specifications (4) to (6) the null-
hypothesis of the validity of the instruments is rejected. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Market share)
Base
No own 
download 
speed
No own price Base No prices in Slovakia No own price
Price (-α) -0.0127*** -0.0131*** -0.0129*** -0.0127*** -0.0127*** -0.0142***
(-12.49) (-12.15) (-10.66) (-12.41) (-12.77) (-7.20)
Avg. download speed (β) 0.00837*** 0.00765*** 0.00760*** 0.00850*** 0.00848*** 0.00791***
(11.75) (8.38) (8.43) (11.71) (12.12) (9.16)
Market share within group (σ) 0.830*** 0.847*** 0.856*** 0.821*** 0.833*** 0.887***
(5.26) (5.20) (5.39) (5.12) (5.41) (5.83)
4G spectrum (MHz) 0.00268*** 0.00326*** 0.00340*** 0.00255*** 0.00256*** 0.00258***
(4.16) (3.87) (4.08) (4.01) (4.13) (3.72)
Operator FE:
TMCZ -0.0321*** -0.0332*** -0.0335*** -0.0318*** -0.0321*** -0.0338***
(-3.02) (-3.15) (-3.17) (-2.99) (-3.04) (-3.22)
Vodafone -0.0989 -0.0823 -0.0771 -0.105 -0.0985 -0.0633
(-1.09) (-0.87) (-0.84) (-1.14) (-1.11) (-0.72)
Constant 1.498*** 1.535*** 1.535*** 1.488*** 1.501*** 1.613***
(8.42) (8.38) (8.40) (8.20) (8.66) (8.98)
Observations 72 72 72 72 72 72
Adj. R² 0.988 0.988 0.988 0.988 0.988 0.987
Over-identification test (p-value) 0.141 0.192 0.301 0.0881 0.0265 0.00773
Elasticities
Own price elasticity -1.782 -2.040 -2.131 -1.688 -1.815 -2.974
Cross price elasticity 0.833 0.959 1.004 0.787 0.850 1.416
Instruments
Lags of own price Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Lags of own (within group) market share Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lag of own download speed Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Lags of prices of operators in Slovakia Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Lags of download speeds of competitors No No No Yes Yes Yes
Change in instruments
(A) (B)
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Table 7-2: Demand estimates with other measures of 4G coverage (resource blocks) 
 
Notes: t-values in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. In subtable (B), the lags of download speeds of 
competitors have been included as instruments. Operator fixed effects are relative to O2, the omitted MNO. 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
7.1.3. 2G and 3G coverage 
Measures of 2G and 3G coverage are included in the set of explanatory variables (in terms of spectrum 
deployed). As shown in Table 7-3, the coefficient associated with 2G coverage is not significantly 
different from zero. When controlling for 3G coverage, however, the coefficient associated with 4G 
coverage becomes non-significant (and the 3G coefficient is only significant at the 10% level). For this 
reason, the baseline demand specification only considers 4G coverage as explanatory variable, and 
the coefficient is significantly different from zero at all significance levels. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Market share)
Base
No own 
download 
speed
No own price Base No prices in Slovakia No own price
Price (-α) -0.0130*** -0.0138*** -0.0136*** -0.0130*** -0.0130*** -0.0169***
(-11.71) (-11.20) (-10.38) (-11.52) (-11.97) (-6.78)
Avg. download speed (β) 0.00791*** 0.00581*** 0.00503*** 0.00823*** 0.00821*** 0.00590***
(7.54) (3.54) (3.05) (7.40) (7.73) (3.35)
Market share within group (σ) 0.781*** 0.805*** 0.820*** 0.762*** 0.771*** 0.915***
(4.58) (4.46) (4.56) (4.41) (4.59) (4.56)
4G resource blocks 0.0000477*** 0.0000857*** 0.000102*** 0.0000414** 0.0000418** 0.0000625**
(2.90) (2.94) (3.30) (2.41) (2.49) (2.51)
Operator FE:
TMCZ -0.0294*** -0.0318*** -0.0329*** -0.0286*** -0.0289*** -0.0344***
(-2.79) (-3.07) (-3.12) (-2.72) (-2.74) (-2.95)
Vodafone -0.136 -0.112 -0.101 -0.148 -0.143 -0.0457
(-1.37) (-1.07) (-0.98) (-1.47) (-1.46) (-0.39)
Constant 1.471*** 1.533*** 1.547*** 1.448*** 1.458*** 1.753***
(7.61) (7.62) (7.74) (7.36) (7.66) (7.33)
Observations 72 72 72 72 72 72
Adj. R² 0.987 0.986 0.986 0.987 0.987 0.983
Over-identification test (p-value) 0.0269 0.0235 0.0787 0.0192 0.00366 0.00600
Elasticities:
Own price elasticity -1.425 -1.688 -1.813 -1.306 -1.360 -4.682
Cross price elasticity 0.656 0.783 0.845 0.597 0.624 2.249
Instruments:
Lags of own price Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Lags of own (within group) market share Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lag of own download speed Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Lags of prices of operators in Slovakia Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Lags of download speeds of competitors No No No Yes Yes Yes
Change in instruments
(A) (B)
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Table 7-3: Demand estimates with measures of 2G and 3G coverage 
 
Notes: t-values in parentheses. * p <0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Operator fixed effects are relative to O2, the omitted 
MNO. 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
7.1.4. Adding year fixed effects 
Adding year fixed effects on the set of explanatory variables allows replicating the findings. As can be 
seen in Table 7-4, none of the coefficients of the year fixed effects are significantly different from zero, 
hence their inclusion in the model is not justified. 
(1) (2) (3)
ln(Market share) Base No 2G spectrum
No 2G/3G 
spectrum
Price (-α) -0.0127*** -0.0121*** -0.0120***
(-12.49) (-12.37) (-11.58)
Avg. download speed (β) 0.00837*** 0.00875*** 0.00886***
(11.75) (12.38) (11.99)
Market share within group (σ) 0.830*** 0.903*** 0.884***
(5.26) (6.34) (6.10)
2G spectrum (MHz) -0.0220
(-0.60)
3G spectrum (MHz) 0.0158** 0.0180**
(2.07) (2.05)
4G spectrum (MHz) 0.00268*** 0.000766 0.000724
(4.16) (0.78) (0.74)
Operator FE:
TMCZ -0.0321*** -0.0422*** -0.0429***
(-3.02) (-3.55) (-3.51)
Vodafone -0.0989 -0.000281 -0.00692
(-1.09) (-0.00) (-0.08)
Constant 1.498*** 1.464*** 1.444***
(8.42) (8.91) (8.64)
Observations 72 72 72
Adj. R² 0.988 0.988 0.988
Over-identification test (p-value) 0.141 0.246 0.283
Elasticities
Own price elasticity -1.782 -2.962 -2.457
Cross price elasticity 0.833 1.418 1.169
Instruments
Lags of own price Yes Yes Yes
Lags of own (within group) market share Yes Yes Yes
Lag of own download speed Yes Yes Yes
Lags of prices of operators in Slovakia Yes Yes Yes
Lags of download speeds of competitors No No No
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Table 7-4: Demand estimates with year fixed effects 
 
Notes: t-values in parentheses. * p <0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. In subtable (B), the lags of download speeds of competitors 
have been included as instruments. Operator fixed effects are relative to O2, the omitted MNO. 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
7.1.5. Data traffic as proxy for 4G coverage 
To be able to consider the complete temporal coverage of the Ookla dataset, data traffic has been 
used as a proxy for 4G coverage (or “data availability coverage”). Since this variable is reported at the 
industry level, however, an interaction with the market share of each operator for data revenue at the 
retail level has been included. This market share data is also available in the AM dataset. 
Results are displayed in Table 7-5. The relevant coefficients display the expected signs and significance 
levels. The only exception is specification (6), in which 𝜎 becomes higher than 1. Finally, note that in 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Market share)
Base
No own 
download 
speed
No own price Base No prices in Slovakia No own price
Price (-α) -0.00978*** -0.0131*** -0.00575 -0.0105*** -0.0120*** -0.00416
(-2.52) (-2.82) (-0.69) (-2.92) (-3.34) (-0.46)
Avg. download speed (β) 0.0113*** 0.00429 -0.00113 0.0123*** 0.0131*** 0.0125***
(7.65) (1.04) (-0.18) (8.14) (8.47) (7.69)
Market share within group (σ) 0.769*** 0.877*** 0.998*** 0.742*** 0.716*** 0.736***
(5.36) (5.18) (4.73) (5.08) (4.92) (4.83)
4G spectrum (MHz) 0.00502*** 0.000933 -0.00120 0.00544*** 0.00570*** 0.00620***
(3.75) (0.34) (-0.31) (3.77) (3.89) (3.87)
Operator FE:
TMCZ -0.0407*** -0.0203 0.000496 -0.0437*** -0.0469*** -0.0405***
(-3.60) (-1.20) (0.02) (-3.79) (-4.18) (-3.08)
Vodafone -0.146* -0.0563 0.0142 -0.162* -0.176** -0.178**
(-1.71) (-0.53) (0.11) (-1.88) (-2.04) (-2.12)
Year fixed effects:
2013 0.0616 0.0463 0.145 0.0508 0.0309 0.121
(1.23) (0.81) (1.37) (1.10) (0.69) (1.18)
2014 0.0304 0.0555 0.235 0.00835 -0.0260 0.108
(0.43) (0.70) (1.34) (0.13) (-0.41) (0.70)
2015 -0.0268 0.0605 0.277 -0.0557 -0.0949 0.0355
(-0.37) (0.65) (1.33) (-0.84) (-1.45) (0.23)
2016 -0.0454 0.0983 0.350 -0.0808 -0.125* 0.00357
(-0.59) (0.84) (1.42) (-1.13) (-1.77) (0.02)
2017 -0.0571 0.168 0.464 -0.101 -0.151* -0.0312
(-0.67) (1.08) (1.54) (-1.25) (-1.88) (-0.21)
Constant 1.288*** 1.551*** 1.330*** 1.294*** 1.342*** 0.992**
(5.66) (5.57) (3.45) (5.82) (5.95) (2.53)
Observations 72 72 72 72 72 72
Adj. R² 0.991 0.989 0.983 0.991 0.990 0.990
Over-identification test (p-value) 0.0553 0.0569 0.138 0.0790 0.0207 0.00405
Elasticities:
Own price elasticity -1.017 -2.515 -76.19 -0.977 -1.023 -0.380
Cross price elasticity 0.466 1.194 37.58 0.444 0.461 0.172
Instruments:
Lags of own price Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Lags of own (within group) market share Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lag of own download speed Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Lags of prices of operators in Slovakia Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Lags of download speeds of competitors No No No Yes Yes Yes
Change in instruments
(A) (B)
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these specifications the null-hypothesis of the validity of the instruments is rejected (see the p-values 
of the over-identification tests) 
Table 7-5: Demand estimates with data traffic as proxy for 4G coverage 
 
Notes: t-values in parentheses. * p <0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. In subtable (B), the lags of download speeds of 
competitors have been included as instruments. Operator fixed effects are relative to O2, the omitted MNO. 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
7.1.6. Simple OLS estimates 
To illustrate that the obtained results are not driven by the choice of instruments, Table 7-6 displays 
the results of estimating the baseline specification with OLS. It can be observed that all variables have 
the expected signs and significance levels. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Market share)
Base
No own 
download 
speed
No own price Base No prices in Slovakia No own price
Price (-α) -0.0144*** -0.0140*** -0.0140*** -0.0143*** -0.0143*** -0.0217***
(-18.79) (-15.34) (-15.23) (-19.22) (-19.42) (-7.93)
Avg. download speed (β) 0.00641*** 0.00693*** 0.00688*** 0.00654*** 0.00653*** 0.000827
(7.62) (6.13) (6.09) (7.77) (7.95) (0.35)
Market share within group (σ) 0.794*** 0.767*** 0.772*** 0.781*** 0.772*** 1.144***
(7.08) (6.31) (6.42) (7.05) (7.03) (4.92)
0.00407*** 0.00358*** 0.00364*** 0.00395*** 0.00395*** 0.00861***
(4.65) (3.09) (3.13) (4.51) (4.59) (4.55)
Operator FE:
TMCZ -0.0368*** -0.0366*** -0.0366*** -0.0366*** -0.0363*** -0.0443***
(-4.28) (-4.24) (-4.25) (-4.25) (-4.23) (-3.26)
Vodafone -0.108* -0.127* -0.124* -0.116* -0.121* 0.133
(-1.67) (-1.76) (-1.74) (-1.81) (-1.91) (0.95)
Constant 1.549*** 1.506*** 1.511*** 1.532*** 1.524*** 2.192***
(12.15) (10.41) (10.54) (12.24) (12.31) (6.88)
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96
Adj. R² 0.989 0.989 0.989 0.989 0.989 0.976
Over-identification test (p-value) 0.00195 0.00306 0.000748 0.00113 0.000491 0.480
Elasticities:
Own price elasticity -1.675 -1.445 -1.476 -1.565 -1.509 3.487
Cross price elasticity 0.774 0.662 0.677 0.720 0.692 -1.800
Instruments:
Lags of own price Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Lags of own (within group) market share Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lag of own download speed Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Lags of prices of operators in Slovakia Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Lags of download speeds of competitors No No No Yes Yes Yes
Change in instruments
(A) (B)
Data traffic * Market share (in retail 
data)
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Table 7-6: OLS estimates 
Notes: t-values in parentheses. * p <0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Operator fixed effects are relative to O2, the omitted 
MNO. 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
7.2.  Robustness checks of the cost estimation 
Table 7-7, Table 7-8 and Table 7-9 display the results of the baseline cost specification, including trends 
(specification 1), year fixed effects (specification 2) and period fixed effects (specification 3), for the 
marginal cost per user, the quality cost parameter obtained under the geo-split equilibrium and the 
quality cost parameter obtained under the JV equilibrium, respectively. Moreover, as a robustness 
check, each table contains the estimation of a cost equation in which the impact of the NSA on costs 
is captured by an operator-specific dummy that takes the value of 1 for every period after Q1-2014 
and takes the value of zero otherwise (DiD specification). These robustness checks are presented 
including trends (specification 4), year fixed effects (specification 5) and period fixed effects 
(specification 6). 
In Table 7-7, the coefficients associated with the deployment of 4G sites (shared and non-shared) 
remain almost unchanged across specifications. In addition, in specifications (4) to (6) the operator-
specific coefficients associated with the Parties are negative, confirming the fact that the NSA 
generates cost efficiencies. Note, however, that only the coefficient associated with TMCZ is 
(1) (2)
ln(Market share) Base
+ Data traffic 
interaction
Price (-α) -0.0129*** -0.0146***
(-12.81) (-19.91)
Avg. download speed (β) 0.00824*** 0.00616***
(11.20) (7.40)
Market share within group (σ) 0.876*** 0.858***
(5.36) (7.48)
4G spectrum (MHz) 0.00273***
(3.95)
Data traffic * Market share (in retail data) 0.00434***
(4.86)
Operator FE:
TMCZ -0.0334*** -0.0387***
(-2.92) (-4.34)
Vodafone -0.0731 -0.0710
(-0.79) (-1.08)
Constant 1.551*** 1.617***
(8.47) (12.74)
Observations 72 99
Adj. R² 0.988 0.989
Elasticities:
Own price elasticity -2.474 -2.444
Cross price elasticity 1.174 1.153
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significant in this case. As shown in the table, these latter results are robust to the inclusion of either, 
trends, year or period fixed effects. 
Table 7-7: Cost equation (marginal cost per user), robustness checks 
 
Notes: t-values in parentheses. * p <0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Operator fixed effects are relative to O2, the omitted 
MNO. 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
Table 7-8 contains the results associated with the quality cost parameter recovered under the geo-
split equilibrium. In this case, both the shared and non-shared sites coefficients are lower in the 
specification including trends. Note, however, that the difference between both coefficients (i.e. the 
measure of cost efficiencies generated by the NSA) is similar across specifications. In specifications (4) 
to (6) the operator-specific coefficients associated with the NSA parties are both negative and 
significant, confirming the fact that the NSA generates cost efficiencies. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Marginal cost per user Base - Sites
+ Trends, no 
year FE
Period fixed 
effects Base - DiD
+ Trends, no 
year FE
Period fixed 
effects
Shared 4G sites 1.136*** 1.116*** 1.136***
(3.66) (4.60) (4.27)
Non-shared 4G sites 2.307*** 2.210*** 2.307***
(4.98) (7.00) (6.01)
NSA (before-after 2014) 0.752 -1.655* -116.0***
(0.89) (-1.91) (-4.37)
Treatment effect:
NSA * O2 1.103 -1.103 -1.103
(-1.18) (-1.39) (-1.46)
NSA * TMCZ -1.959** -1.959*** -1.959**
(-2.23) (-2.66) (-2.63)
Trend -2.389*** -0.834***
(-9.09) (-3.72)
Trend² 0.0627*** 0.0309***
(10.27) (4.83)
MTR 8.175*** 4.990*** 22.070*** 7.317*** 3.151*** -29.970***
(6.64) (4.58) (9.65) (5.13) (10.22) (-3.79)
Operator FE:
TMCZ -2.023*** -1.999*** -2.023*** -0.673 -0.673 -0.673
(-6.32) (-8.85) (-8.43) (-0.89) (-0.93) (-1.21)
Vodafone 3.238*** 3.426*** 3.238*** 5.700*** 5.700*** 5.700***
(4.61) (6.04) (6.04) (6.50) (7.98) (8.07)
Constant 3.487* 19.490*** -18.350*** 4.230** 13.890*** 154.2***
(1.90) (7.15) (-5.00) (2.33) (7.51) (4.57)
Observations 60 60 60 72 72 72
Adj. R² 0.960 0.962 0.971 0.969 0.975 0.978
Quarter fixed effeccs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes No No Yes No No
Period fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes
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Table 7-8: Cost equation (quality cost parameter), robustness checks 
 
Notes: t-values in parentheses. * p <0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Because of the timing in the deployment of 4G sites, 
specifications 1 to 3 cover the period from Q1-2013 to Q4-2017 (60 observations), while specifications 4 to 6 cover the whole 
estimation period from Q1-2012 to Q4-2017 (72 observations). Operator fixed effects are relative to O2, the omitted MNO. 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
Table 7-9 presents the results associated with the quality cost parameter recovered under the JV 
equilibrium. As in the previous case, both the shared and non-shared sites coefficients are lower in 
the specification that includes trends. The difference between both coefficients (i.e. the measure of 
cost efficiencies generated by the NSA) is, however, similar across specifications. Finally, in 
specifications (4) to (6) the operator-specific coefficients associated with the NSA parties are both 
negative and significant, confirming the fact that the NSA generates cost efficiencies. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quality cost parameter 
(Competitive) Base - Sites
+ Trends, no 
year FE
Period fixed 
effects Base - DiD
+ Trends, no 
year FE
Period fixed 
effects
Shared 4G sites 0.0379** 0.00920 0.0379**
(2.18) (0.83) (2.08)
Non-shared 4G sites 0.107*** 0.0641*** 0.107***
(3.67) (3.14) (3.36)
NSA (before-after 2014) -0.0500* 0.0459** -1.665
(-1.81) (2.02) (-0.77)
Treatment effect:
NSA * O2 -0.338*** -0.338*** -0.338***
(-14.48) (-21.19) (-18.13)
NSA * TMCZ -0.0840*** -0.0840*** -0.0840***
(-3.50) (-4.52) (-4.33)
Trend -0.0798*** -0.0327***
(-3.96) (-6.30)
Trend-squared 0.00194*** 0.00080***
(3.94) (5.54)
MTR 0.172* 0.0586 0.978*** 0.172*** 0.0138** -0.405
(1.83) (0.56) (4.82) (3.77) (2.14) (-0.63)
Operator FE:
TMCZ -0.0883*** -0.0771*** -0.0883*** -0.264*** -0.264*** -0.264***
(-3.95) (-3.56) (-3.49) (-14.10) (-13.64) (-21.30)
Vodafone -0.304*** -0.267*** -0.304*** -0.403*** -0.403*** -0.403***
(-6.35) (-5.59) (-5.59) (-18.79) (-28.79) (-23.81)
Constant 0.189 0.752*** -1.104*** 0.310*** 0.697*** 2.458
(1.39) (3.08) (-3.74) (4.61) (18.79) (0.89)
Observations 60 60 60 72 72 72
Adj. R² 0.830 0.814 0.792 0.972 0.981 0.982
Year fixed effects Yes No No Yes No No
Period fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes
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Table 7-9: Cost equation (quality cost parameter JV model), robustness checks 
 
Notes: t-values in parentheses. * p <0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Because of the timing in the deployment of 4G sites, 
specifications 1 to 3 cover the period from Q1-2013 to Q4-2017 (60 observations), while specifications 4 to 6 cover the whole 
estimation period from Q1-2012 to Q4-2017 (72 observations). Operator fixed effects are relative to O2, the omitted MNO. 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
7.3.  Robustness checks relating to the geo-split equilibrium 
This section shows that the results presented in Section 5.3.3 do not depend on the assumption that 
counterfactual costs of quality 𝑘෨௜௧ீௌ for all MNOs are increased by 20%. We keep increasing marginal 
costs of quantity for Vodafone by 33% but vary the exogenous increase in counterfactual quality costs 
for all firms. The result of this exercise is summarized in Table 7-10 below and shows that regardless 
of the magnitude of the considered exogenous cost increase, the NSA results in lower prices, higher 
network quality and higher consumer surplus. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quality cost parameter 
(Hybrid)
Base - Sites + Trends, no 
year FE
Period fixed 
effects
Base - DiD + Trends, no 
year FE
Period fixed 
effects
Shared 4G sites 0.0714*** 0.0181 0.0714***
(3.94) (1.42) (3.45)
Non-shared 4G sites 0.157*** 0.0785*** 0.157***
(5.16) (3.20) (4.52)
Treatment effect
NSA * O2 -0.407*** -0.407*** -0.407***
(-18.79) (-26.71) (-23.89)
NSA * TMCZ -0.144*** -0.144*** -0.144***
(-6.07) (-7.43) (-7.64)
NSA (before-after 2014) -0.0349 0.0112 -0.930*
(-1.29) (0.59) (-1.68)
Trend -0.0992*** -0.0270***
(-4.02) (-6.35)
Trend² 0.00248*** 0.00072***
(4.12) (5.74)
MTR 0.170* 0.0767 1.316*** 0.170*** 0.0208*** -0.190
(1.80) (0.60) (5.98) (3.74) (3.57) (-1.15)
Operator FE:
TMCZ -0.0937*** -0.0732*** -0.0937*** -0.264*** -0.264*** -0.264***
(-4.07) (-2.75) (-3.55) (-14.05) (-12.91) (-21.30)
Vodafone -0.293*** -0.225*** -0.293*** -0.403*** -0.403*** -0.403***
(-5.84) (-3.72) (-5.11) (-18.84) (-27.14) (-23.81)
Constant 0.175 0.796** -1.670*** 0.312*** 0.653*** 1.541**
(1.30) (2.60) (-5.14) (4.65) (20.64) (2.18)
Observations 60 60 60 72 72 72
Adj. R² 0.843 0.743 0.795 0.983 0.986 0.990
Year fixed effects Yes No No Yes No No
Period fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes
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Table 7-10: Sensitivity analysis geo-split equilibrium  
 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
8. Conclusion 
We presented a structural model of demand and supply in telecommunication industries to estimate 
the effects of NSAs that are organized either in the form of a geo-splitting agreement or a joint 
venture. The methodological framework is general and can be applied by competition authorities and 
regulators around the globe to gauge the competitive effects of different network sharing 
agreements. We estimated the model in the Czech mobile telecommunications market to study the 
effects of the 2G/3G and 4G/LTE network sharing agreements between TMCZ and O2. We find that 
the NSAs had a positive impact on consumers by generating higher network quality and lower prices.  
The application to the Czech Republic highlights that NSAs involving active sharing can be beneficial 
for consumers. As argued in Maier-Rigaud, Ivaldi & Heller (2020), this finding has direct implications 
for competition policy. Overly restrictive scrutiny towards NSAs can result in adverse consequences 
on competitive outcomes and even absent any restrictive decisions, the threat of future scrutiny could 
prevent beneficial NSAs to be undertaken. We argue that no restrictions to network sharing based on 
potential anti-competitive effects should be implemented unless such effects have been 
demonstrated by a rigorous econometric assessment. By presenting a general framework for 
analyzing the competitive effects of NSAs, our paper offers a first step towards such an evidence-
based approach.  
TMCZ O2 Vodafone
----------------------------- % ---------------------------
5 12.9 12.6 14.7
10 12.1 12.1 15.7
15 13.1 13.1 14.6
20 14.8 14.6 12.5
25 14.7 14.6 12.5
30 14.6 14.5 12.6
5 -4.0 -3.3 -13.5
10 -10.6 -9.6 -10.3
15 -12.6 -10.8 -24.0
20 -11.3 -9.8 -44.3
25 -15.2 -13.6 -46.1
30 -18.8 -17.1 -47.8
5
10
15
20
25
30
Industry wide
% € Mn.
-96.6
-5.9 -111.1
Consumer 
Surplus %
-4.1 -77.5
-4.5 -83.4
-5.2
-6.6 -124.5
-6.3 -118.1
Exogenous increase of the 
quality cost parameter
Operator
Price %
Download speed %
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